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Abstract The main result of this paper is the convexity of step out–step in (SoSi)
sequencing games, a class of relaxed sequencing games first analyzed by Musegaas et
al. (Eur J Oper Res 246:894–906, 2015). The proof makes use of a polynomial time
algorithm determining the value and an optimal processing order for an arbitrary coali-
tion in a SoSi sequencing game. In particular, we use that in determining an optimal
processing order of a coalition, the algorithm can start from the optimal processing
order found for any subcoalition of smaller size and thus all information on such an
optimal processing order can be used.
Keywords (Cooperative) game theory · Relaxed sequencing games · Convexity
Mathematics Subject Classification 91A12 (Cooperative games) · 90B35
(Scheduling theory, deterministic)
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1 Introduction
This paper considers one-machine sequencing situations in which a certain number of
players, each with one job, have to be served by a single machine. The processing time
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of a job is the time the machine takes to process the corresponding job of this player.
Every player has an individual linear cost function, specified by an individual cost
parameter, which depends on the completion time of this job which is defined as the
sum of the processing times of his own job and the jobs that are processed before his
own job. There are no further restrictive assumptions such as due dates, ready times or
precedence constraints imposed on the jobs. Smith (1956) showed that the total joint
costs are minimal if the jobs are processed in weakly decreasing order with respect to
their urgency, defined as the ratio of the individual cost parameter and the processing
time.
We assume that the players are arranged in an initial order and thus the rearrange-
ment of the initial order to an optimal order will lead to cost savings. To analyze
the problem on how these cost savings should be allocated to the players, sequenc-
ing games are introduced. The value of a coalition in a sequencing game serves as
a benchmark for determining a fair allocation of the optimal cost savings and repre-
sents the “virtual” maximal cost savings which this coalition can achieve by means
of admissible rearrangements. Which rearrangements are admissible for a coalition is
a modeling choice. The classical assumption made in Curiel et al. (1989) is that two
players of a certain coalition can only swap their positions if all players between them
are also members of the coalition. They show that the resulting sequencing games
are convex and therefore have a non-empty core. Relaxed sequencing games arise
by relaxing this classical assumption about the set of admissible rearrangements for
coalitions in a consistent way.
In Curiel et al. (1993), four different relaxed sequencing games are introduced.
These relaxations are based on requirements for the players outside the coalition
regarding either their position in the processing order or their starting time. Slikker
(2006) considered these four relaxed sequencing games in more detail by investigating
the corresponding cores. In van Velzen and Hamers (2003) two further classes of
relaxed sequencing games are considered. In relaxed sequencing games the values
of coalitions become larger because the set of admissible rearrangements is larger
than in the classical case. As a consequence, while classical sequencing games are
convex, relaxed sequencing games might not be convex anymore. To the best of our
knowledge there is no general convexity result with respect to specific subclasses of
relaxed sequencing games.
In Musegaas et al. (2015) an alternative class of relaxed sequencing games is consid-
ered, the class of step out–step in (SoSi) sequencing games. In a SoSi sequencing game
a member of a coalition is allowed to step out from his position in the processing order
and to step in at any position later in the processing order. Providing an upper bound on
the values of the coalitions in a SoSi sequencing game, Musegaas et al. (2015) showed
that every SoSi sequencing game has a non-empty core. Also, Musegaas et al. (2015)
provided a polynomial time algorithm to determine the value and an optimal process-
ing order for an arbitrary coalition in a SoSi sequencing game. This paper shows, by
means of this polynomial time algorithm, that SoSi sequencing games are convex. For
proving this, we use a specific feature of the algorithm. Namely, for determining an
optimal processing order for a coalition, one can use the information of the optimal
processing orders of subcoalitions. More precisely, if one wants to know an optimal
processing order for a coalition S ∪ {i}, then the algorithm can start from the optimal
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processing order found for coalition S. In particular, this helps to analyze the marginal
contribution of a player i to joining coalitions S, T with S ⊆ T and i /∈ T , and thus
it helps to prove the convexity of SoSi sequencing games.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 recalls basic definitions
on one-machine sequencing situations and the formal definition of a SoSi sequenc-
ing game. Section 3 identifies a number of important key features of the algorithm
of Musegaas et al. (2015) that are especially useful in proving the convexity of SoSi
sequencing games. In Sect. 4 the proof of convexity for SoSi sequencing games is
provided.
2 SoSi sequencing games
This section recalls basic definitions on one-machine sequencing situations and related
SoSi sequencing games.
A one-machine sequencing situation can be summarized by a tuple (N , σ0, p, α),
where N is the set of players, each with one job to be processed on the single machine. A
processing order of the players can be described by a bijection σ : N → {1, . . . , |N |}.
More specifically, σ(i) = k means that player i is in position k. Let (N ) denote the
set of all such processing orders. The processing order σ0 ∈ (N ) specifies the initial
order. The processing time pi > 0 of the job of player i is the time the machine takes to
process this job. The vector p ∈ RN++ summarizes the processing times. Furthermore,
the costs for player i of spending t time units in the system is assumed to be determined
by a linear cost function ci : [0,∞) → R given by ci (t) = αi t with αi > 0. The
vector α ∈ RN++ summarizes the coefficients of the linear cost functions. It is assumed
that the machine starts processing at time t = 0, and also that all jobs enter the system
at t = 0.
The total joint costs of a processing order σ ∈ (N ) are given by ∑i∈N αi Ci (σ ),
where Ci (σ ) denotes the completion time of player i and is defined by
Ci (σ ) =
∑
j∈N :σ( j)≤σ(i)
p j .
A processing order is called optimal if it minimizes the total joint costs over all
possible processing orders. In Smith (1956) it is shown that in each optimal order
the players are processed in weakly decreasing order with respect to their urgency ui
defined by ui = αipi . The maximal total cost savings are equal to the difference in total
costs between the initial order and an optimal order.
A coalitional game is a pair (N , v) where N denotes a non-empty, finite set of
players and v : 2N → R assigns a monetary payoff to each coalition S ∈ 2N , where
2N denotes the collection of all subsets of N . In general, the value v(S) equals the
highest payoff the coalition S can jointly generate by means of optimal cooperation
without help of players in N\S. By convention, v(∅) = 0.
To tackle the allocation problem of the maximal cost savings in a sequencing sit-
uation (N , σ0, p, α), one can analyze an associated coalitional game (N , v). Here N
naturally corresponds to the set of players in the game and, for a coalition S ⊆ N , v(S)
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reflects the maximal cost savings this coalition can make with respect to the initial
order σ0. In order to determine these maximal cost savings, assumptions must be made
on the possible reorderings of coalition S with respect to the initial order σ0.
The classical (strong) assumption is that a member of a certain coalition S ⊂ N
can only swap with another member of the coalition if all players between these two
players, according to the initial order, are also members of S. Note that the resulting
set of admissible reorderings for a coalition is quite restrictive, because there may be
more reorderings possible which do not hurt the interests of the players outside the
coalition.
In a SoSi sequencing game a member of the coalition S is allowed to step out from
his position in the processing order and to step in at any position later in the processing
order. Note that from an optimality point of view it is clear that one can assume without
loss of generality that a member of S who steps out, only steps in at a position directly
behind another member of the coalition S. This means that for every player outside
S its set of predecessors cannot become larger and its direct follower was already a
follower of him in the initial order. Hence, a processing order σ is called admissible
for S in a SoSi sequencing game if
(i) P(σ, i) ⊆ P(σ0, i) for all i ∈ N\S,
(ii) σ−1(σ (i) + 1) ∈ F(σ0, i) for all i ∈ N\S with σ(i) 
= |N |,
where P(σ, i) = { j ∈ N | σ( j) < σ(i)} denotes the set of predecessors of player i
with respect to processing order σ and F(σ, i) = { j ∈ N | σ( j) > σ(i)} denotes the
set of followers. Given an initial order σ0 the set of admissible orders for coalition S
is denoted by A(σ0, S). Correspondingly, Musegaas et al. (2015) defined the Step out,
Step in (SoSi) sequencing game (N , v) by
v(S) = max
σ∈A(σ0,S)
∑
i∈S
αi (Ci (σ0) − Ci (σ )),
for all S ⊆ N . A processing order σ ∗ ∈ A(σ0, S) is called optimal for S if
∑
i∈S
αi (Ci (σ0) − Ci (σ ∗)) = max
σ∈A(σ0,S)
∑
i∈S
αi (Ci (σ0) − Ci (σ )).
Note that a processing order is admissible for a coalition in a classical sequencing
game if there is an equality in condition (i). Therefore, given a coalition, the corre-
sponding set of admissible orders in a SoSi sequencing game is larger than the set of
admissible orders in the corresponding classical sequencing game. As a consequence,
the values of coalitions in SoSi sequencing games can become larger with respect to
classical sequencing games.
The following example provides an instance of a SoSi sequencing game.
Example 2.1 Consider a one-machine sequencing situation with N = {1, 2, 3}. The
vector of processing times is p = (3, 2, 1), the vector of coefficients corresponding
to the linear cost functions is α = (4, 6, 5) and the initial order is σ0 = (1 2 3). Let
(N , v) be the corresponding SoSi sequencing game. Table 1 provides the values of all
coalitions.
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Table 1 The SoSi sequencing
game of Example 2.1 S {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} N
v(S) 0 0 0 10 3 4 25
1
4
3
3
2
6
2
5
3
5
1
6
αi
pi
Ci((1 2 3))
2
6
2
2
3
5
1
3
1
4
3
6
αi
pi
Ci((2 3 1))
Fig. 1 The two admissible orders for coalition {1, 3} in Example 2.1
Note that the values of the coalitions in the game (N , v) are equal to the values
of the coalitions in the classical sequencing game of this one-machine sequencing
situation except for the only disconnected coalition, coalition {1, 3}. Coalition {1, 3}
cannot save costs in the classical sequencing game because there exists no admissible
order other than the initial order. However, in the SoSi sequencing game coalition
{1, 3} has two admissible orders:1
A(σ0, {1, 3}) = {(1 2 3), (2 3 1)} .
These processing orders are illustrated in Fig. 1. Hence, the value of coalition {1, 3}
is given by
v({1, 3})=max
⎧
⎨
⎩
0,
∑
i∈{1,3}
αi (Ci ((1 2 3))−Ci ((2 3 1)))
⎫
⎬
⎭
= max {0,−12 + 15} = 3. 
3 On the algorithm for finding the values of the coalitions
Musegaas et al. (2015) provided a polynomial time algorithm to determine an optimal
order for every possible coalition and, consequently, the values of the coalitions. For
proving convexity of SoSi sequencing games, we use specific key features of this
algorithm. In this section we will derive and summarize these specific features. For
example, in Theorem 3.4, we will show that in determining an optimal processing
order of a coalition S ∪ {i} in a SoSi sequencing game, the algorithm can start from
the optimal processing order found for coalition S.
We start with recalling some definitions such as components. For S ∈ 2N\{∅},
σ ∈ (N ) and s, t ∈ N with σ(s) < σ(t), define
Sσ (s, t) = {i ∈ S | σ(s) < σ(i) < σ(t)} ,
S¯σ (s, t) = {i ∈ N\S | σ(s) < σ(i) < σ(t)} ,
Sσ [s, t] = {i ∈ S | σ(s) ≤ σ(i) ≤ σ(t)} ,
S¯σ [s, t] = {i ∈ N\S | σ(s) ≤ σ(i) ≤ σ(t)} .
1 Processing order (2 3 1) means that player 2 is in the first position, player 3 in the second position and
player 1 in the last position.
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The sets of players Sσ [s, t), S¯σ [s, t), Sσ (s, t] and S¯σ (s, t] are defined in a similar
way.
A coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅} is called connected with respect to σ0 if for all i, j ∈ S
and k ∈ N such that σ0(i) < σ0(k) < σ0( j) it holds that k ∈ S. A connected coalition
U ⊆ S with respect to σ0 is called a component of S with respect to σ0 if U ⊆ U ′ ⊆ S
and U ′ connected with respect to σ0 implies that U ′ = U . Let h(σ0, S) ≥ 1 denote
the number of components of S with respect to σ0. The partition of S into components
with respect to σ0 is denoted by
S\σ0 =
{
Sσ01 , S
σ0
2 , . . . , S
σ0
h(σ0,S)
}
,
where for each k ∈ {1, . . . , h(σ0, S)−1}, i ∈ Sσ0k and j ∈ Sσ0k+1 we haveσ0(i) < σ0( j).
In the same way, processing order σ0 divides N\S into subgroups. For this, define
Sσ00 =
{
i ∈ N\S | σ0(i) < σ0( j) for all j ∈ Sσ01
}
,
Sσ0h(σ0,S) =
{
i ∈ N\S | σ0(i) > σ0( j) for all j ∈ Sσ0h(σ0,S)
}
,
Sσ0k =
{
i ∈ N\S | σ0( j) < σ0(i) < σ0(l) for all j ∈ Sσ0k , for all l ∈ Sσ0k+1
}
,
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , h(σ0, S) − 1}. Notice that Sσ00 and Sσ0h(σ0,S) might be empty sets,
but Sσ0k 
= ∅ for all k ∈ {1, . . . , h(σ0, S) − 1}. See Fig. 2 for an illustration of the
subdivision of S and N\S into subgroups by means of processing order σ0.
Note that for given S ⊆ N it is possible that a processing order σ ∈ A(σ0, S)
contains less components than σ0, because all players of a certain component with
respect to S may step out from this component and join other components. For σ ∈
A(σ0, S) with σ0 ∈ (N ), define modified components Sσ0,σ1 , . . . , Sσ0,σh(σ0,S) by
Sσ0,σk =
{
i ∈ S | σ( j) < σ(i) < σ(l) for all j ∈ Sσ0k−1, for all l ∈ Sσ0k
}
,
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , h(σ0, S)}. Hence, Sσ0,σk consists of the group of players that are
positioned in processing order σ in between the subgroups Sσ0k−1 and S
σ0
k .
Note that Sσ0,σk might be empty for some k while
h(σ0,S)⋃
k=1
Sσ0,σk = S.
Moreover, recall that a player is not allowed to move to an earlier component (condition
(i) of admissibility), but he is allowed to move to any position later in the processing
order and thus we have
S
σ0
0 S
σ0
1 S
σ0
1 S
σ0
2 S
σ0
2 S
σ0
3
. . . Sσ0h(σ0,S) S
σ0
h(σ0,S)
Fig. 2 Partition of the players in S and N\S with respect to an order σ0
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S
σ0
0 1 2 3 S
σ0
1 4 5 S
σ0
2 6 S
σ0
3 7 8 9 10 S
σ0
4
σ0
Sσ01 S
σ0
2 S
σ0
3 S
σ0
4
S
σ0
0 3 S
σ0
1 4 2 S
σ0
2 S
σ0
3 10 1 7 6 5 9 8 S
σ0
4 σ
Sσ0,σ1 S
σ0,σ
2 S
σ0,σ
4
(a) 
(b)
Fig. 3 Illustration of components and modified components. a Illustration of the components of S with
respect to σ0. b Illustration of the modified components of S with respect to σ and initial order σ0
l⋃
k=1
Sσ0,σk ⊆
l⋃
k=1
Sσ0k ,
for all l ∈ {1, . . . , h(σ0, S)}. Furthermore, denote the index of the corresponding
modified component of player i ∈ S in processing order σ with respect to initial
processing order σ0 by c(i, S, σ ), where
c(i, S, σ ) = k if and only if i ∈ Sσ0,σk .
Since the component index of player i ∈ S with respect to σ can only be increased
(due to condition (i) of admissibility), we have
c(i, S, σ ) ≥ c(i, S, σ0).
An illustration of the definitions of components, modified components and the index
c(i, S, σ ) can be found in the following example.
Example 3.1 Consider a one-machine sequencing situation (N , σ0, p, α) with S ⊆ N
such that S = {1, 2, . . . , 10}. In Fig. 3a an illustration can be found of initial processing
order σ0 and the partition of S into components. Next, consider processing order σ as
illustrated in Fig. 3b that is admissible for S. Note that σ contains less components than
σ0. Figure 3b also illustrates the definition of modified components. Note that there
is one modified component that is empty, namely Sσ0,σ3 . Since player 3 belongs to the
first modified component, we have c(3, S, σ ) = 1. Moreover, since player 3 is the only
player who belongs to the first modified component, we have Sσ0,σ1 = {3}. Similarly,
we have c(4, S, σ ) = c(2, S, σ ) = 2, and c(i, S, σ ) = 4, for all i ∈ S\{2, 3, 4}. 
To find an optimal order for every possible coalition, Musegaas et al. (2015)
provided a polynomial time algorithm. Given a one-machine sequencing situation
(N , σ0, p, α) and a coalition S ∈ 2N\{∅}, the polynomial time algorithm introduced
by Musegaas et al. (2015) starts with a preprocessing step. In this preprocessing step,
the players within the components of S are reordered such that they are in weakly
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decreasing order with respect to their urgency. This is done by setting the initial pro-
cessing order σ0 equal to the processing order σ S0 , where σ
S
0 ∈ A(σ0, S) is the unique
urgency respecting processing order such that for all i ∈ S
c(i, S, σ S0 ) = c(i, S, σ0), (1)
where a processing order σ ∈ (N ) is called urgency respecting with respect to S if
(i) (σ is componentwise optimal) for all i, j ∈ S with c(i, S, σ ) = c( j, S, σ ):
σ(i) < σ( j) ⇒ ui ≥ u j .
(ii) (σ satisfies partial tiebreaking) for all i, j ∈ S with c(i, S, σ0) = c( j, S, σ0):
ui = u j , σ0(i) < σ0( j) ⇒ σ(i) < σ( j).
Note that (1) states that all players in S stay in their component, i.e., the partition of S
into components stays the same. Moreover, condition (i) of urgency respecting states
that the players within a component of S are in weakly decreasing order with respect
to their urgency. Moreover, a tiebreaking rule in condition (ii) ensures that if there are
two players with the same urgency in the same component of S with respect to σ0,
then the player who was first in σ0 is earlier in processing order σ . Note that the partial
tiebreaking condition does not imply anything about the relative order of two players
with the same urgency who are in the same component of S with respect to σ but who
were in different components of S with respect to σ0. Therefore, an arbitrary urgency
respecting order does not need to be unique, but σ S0 , because of condition (1), is.
After the preprocessing step, the players in S are considered in reverse order with
respect to σ S0 and for every player the algorithm checks whether moving the player to a
certain position later in the processing order is beneficial. If so, then the algorithm will
move this player. The algorithm works in a greedy way in the sense that every player
is moved to the position giving the highest cost savings at that moment. Moreover,
every player is considered in the algorithm exactly once and every player is moved to
another position in the processing order at most once. The obtained processing order
after the complete run of the algorithm is denoted by σS .
The following properties follow directly from the definition and the characteristics
of the algorithm for finding the optimal processing order σS for coalition S and will
be used in this paper in order to show that SoSi sequencing games are convex.
– Property (i): after every step during the run of the algorithm, we have a processing
order that is urgency respecting with respect to S.
– Property (ii): if during the run of the algorithm a player is moved to a position
later in the processing order, then this results in strictly positive cost savings which
corresponds to the highest possible cost savings at that instance. In case of multiple
options, we choose the component that is most to the left and, in that component,
we choose the position that is most to the left.
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– Property (iii): the mutual order between players who have already been considered
will stay the same during the rest of the run of the algorithm.
– Property (iv): the processing order σS is the unique optimal processing order such
that no player can be moved to an earlier component while the total costs remain the
same. Also, if there are two players with the same urgency in the same component,
then the player who was first in σ0 is earlier in processing order σS .
– Property (v): if it is admissible with respect to σ0 to move a player to a component
more to the left with respect to order σS , then moving this player to this component
will lead to higher total costs.
An interesting property for the urgencies of players in an optimal order is that if it is
admissible that two players switch position, then the player with the highest urgency
should be positioned first. This is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1 [cf. Lemma 4.1 in Musegaas et al. (2015)] Let (N , σ0, p, α) be a one-
machine sequencing situation, let S ∈ 2N \{∅} and let σ ∈ A(σ0, S) be an optimal
order for S. Let k, l ∈ S with σ(k) < σ(l) and c(l, σ0, S) ≤ c(k, σ, S). Then, uk ≥ ul .
From the previous proposition together with the fact that the algorithm moves a
player to the left as far as possible (see property (ii) of the algorithm), we have that if
the algorithm moves player k to a later component, then the players from coalition S
that player k jumps over all have a strictly higher urgency than player k.
In the following example the algorithm is applied on an instance of a SoSi sequenc-
ing game. In this example we use the concept of composed costs per time unit and
composed processing times, where the composed costs per time unit αU and the com-
posed processing time pU for a coalition U ∈ 2N are defined by
αU =
∑
i∈U
αi ,
and
pU =
∑
i∈U
pi ,
respectively.
Example 3.2 Consider a one-machine sequencing situation (N , σ0, p, α) with S ⊆ N
such that S = {1, 2, . . . , 10}. In Fig. 4 an illustration can be found of initial order
σ0 together with all relevant data on the cost coefficients and processing times (the
numbers above and below the players, respectively). The completion times of the
players with respect to this initial order are also indicated in the figure (bottom line in
bold).
S
σ0
0
1
1
1
4
9
10
2
3
6
16
3
5
4
20
S
σ0
1
5
25
4
6
4
29
5
3
9
38
S
σ0
2
5
43
6
3
8
51
S
σ0
3
3
54
7
4
9
63
8
2
10
73
9
2
8
81
10
7
7
88
S
σ0
4
2
90
αi
σ0
pi
Ci(σ0)
Fig. 4 Initial order σ0 in Example 3.2
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In the preprocessing step the algorithm processing order σ is set to processing order
σ S0 (see Fig. 5) and we initialize
v(S) :=
∑
i∈S
αi (Ci (σ0) − Ci (σ S0 )) = 187.
Next, the players in S are considered in reverse order with respect to σ S0 and the
algorithm starts with the last player of the penultimate component, which is player 6.
Player 6: if player 6 is moved to the last component, then the position of player 6
should be behind player 7 (since the players in the components must stay in weakly
decreasing order with respect to their urgencies, see property (i) of the algorithm). The
resulting cost savings are
αSσ (6,7] p6 − α6 pNσ (6,7] = (α10 + α7)p6 − α6(pSσ03 + p10 + p7)
= 11 · 8 − 3 · 19 = 31.
Hence, we update processing order σ by moving player 6 to the position directly
behind player 7 (see Fig. 6) and we set v(S) := 187 + 31 = 218.
Player 5: according to the given urgencies, player 5 should be moved to the position
directly behind player 6 if he is moved to a later component. The resulting cost savings
are
αSσ (5,6] p5 − α5 pNσ (5,6] = (α10 + α7 + α6)p5 − α5(pSσ02 + pSσ03 + p10 + p7 + p6)
= 14 · 9 − 3 · 32 = 30.
Hence, we update processing order σ by moving player 5 to the position directly
behind player 6 (see Fig. 7) and we set v(S) := 218 + 30 = 248.
S
σ0
0
1
1
3
5
4
5
2
3
6
11
1
4
9
20
S
σ0
1
5
25
4
6
4
29
5
3
9
38
S
σ0
2
5
43
6
3
8
51
S
σ0
3
3
54
10
7
7
61
7
4
9
70
9
2
8
78
8
2
10
88
S
σ0
4
2
90
σS0
αi
pi
Ci(σS0 )
Fig. 5 The processing order σ after the preprocessing step in Example 3.2
S
σ0
0 3 2 1 S
σ0
1 4 5 S
σ0
2 S
σ0
3 10 7 6 9 8 S
σ0
4
Fig. 6 The processing order σ after player 6 is considered in Example 3.2
S
σ0
0 3 2 1 S
σ0
1 4 S
σ0
2 S
σ0
3 10 7 6 5 9 8 S
σ0
4
Fig. 7 The processing order σ after player 5 is considered in Example 3.2
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S
σ0
0 3 2 S
σ0
1 4 S
σ0
2 S
σ0
3 10 1 7 6 5 9 8 S
σ0
4
Fig. 8 The processing order σ after player 1 is considered in Example 3.2
S
σ0
0 3 S
σ0
1 4 2 S
σ0
2 S
σ0
3 10 1 7 6 5 9 8 S
σ0
4
Fig. 9 The processing order σ after player 2 is considered in Example 3.2
Player 4: since all followers of player 4 who are members of S have a lower urgency,
it is impossible to reduce the total costs by moving player 4 to a different position (see
Proposition (3.1)). Hence, σ and v(S) are not changed.
Player 1: there are two components behind player 1. If player 1 is moved to a different
component, then the position of player 1 should be either directly behind player 4 or
directly behind player 10. The resulting cost savings are 18 and 21, respectively. Hence,
player 1 is moved behind player 10 (see property (ii) of the algorithm). Processing
order σ is updated (see Fig. 8) and v(S) is increased by 21, so v(S) := 269.
Player 2: like in the previous step we have again two possibilities, namely moving
behind player 4 with cost savings 9 or behind player 10 with cost savings 6. Hence,
it is most beneficial to move player 2 behind player 4. Processing order σ is updated
(see Fig. 9) and v(S) is increased by 9, so v(S) := 278.
Player 3: there are two components behind player 3. Note that all players in the last
component have a lower urgency than player 3. Therefore, it is impossible to reduce
the total costs by moving player 3 to the last component. If player 3 is moved to the
second component, then the position of player 3 should be directly behind player 4. The
resulting cost savings are −21 and thus moving player 3 to the second component will
not reduce the total costs. Hence, the order depicted in Fig. 9 is the optimal processing
order σS for coalition S obtained by the algorithm. Furthermore, v(S) = 278. 
The following proposition, which will frequently be used later on, provides a basic
property of composed costs per time unit and composed processing times. Namely, if
every player in a set of players U is individually more urgent than a specific player i ,
then also the composed job U as a whole is more urgent than player i .2
Proposition 3.2 Let U  N with U 
= ∅ and let i ∈ N\U. If ui < u j for all j ∈ U,
then
αi
pi
<
αU
pU
,
or equivalently,
αi pU − αU pi < 0.
Proof Assume ui < u j for all j ∈ U , i.e., αi p j < α j pi , for all j ∈ U . By adding
these |U | equations we get αi ∑ j∈U p j < pi
∑
j∈U α j , i.e.,
2 Note that this proposition also holds if every < sign is replaced by a >, ≤ or ≥ sign.
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αi
pi
<
∑
j∈U α j
∑
j∈U p j
= αU
pU
.
unionsq
The following lemma compares the processing orders that are obtained from the
algorithm with respect to coalition S and coalition S ∪ {i}, in case player i ∈ N\S is
the only player in the component of S ∪ {i} with respect to σ0. This lemma will be the
driving force behind Theorem 3.4, which in turn is the crux for proving convexity of
SoSi sequencing games.
Lemma 3.3 Let (N , σ0, p, α) be a one-machine sequencing situation, let S  N with
S 
= ∅ and let i ∈ N\S be such that (S ∪ {i})σ0c(i,S∪{i},σ0) = {i}. Then, for all k ∈ S we
have
c
(
k, S ∪ {i}, σS∪{i}
) ≥ c(k, S ∪ {i}, σS).
Proof See Appendix A. unionsq
From the previous lemma it follows that if one wants to determine an optimal
processing order of a coalition in a SoSi sequencing game, then the information of
optimal processing orders of specific subcoalitions can be used. More precisely, if
one wants to know the optimal processing order σS∪{i} derived by the algorithm for a
coalition S ∪ {i} with i /∈ S and i being the only player in its component in σ0, then
it does not matter whether you take σ0 or σS as initial processing order, as is stated in
the following theorem.
Since the initial order will be varied we need some additional notation. We denote
the obtained processing order after the complete run of the algorithm for one-
machine sequencing situation (N , σ, p, α) with initial order σ and coalition S by
Alg((N , σ, p, α), S). Hence, Alg((N , σ0, p, α), S) = σS .
Theorem 3.4 Let (N , σ0, p, α) be a one-machine sequencing situation, let S  N
with S 
= ∅ and let i ∈ N\S be such that (S ∪ {i})σ0c(i,S∪{i},σ0) = {i}. Then,
σS∪{i} = Alg ((N , σS, p, α), S ∪ {i}) .
Proof We start with proving that the minimum costs for coalition S ∪ {i} in the
sequencing situation (N , σ0, p, α) is equal to the minimum costs for coalition S ∪ {i}
in the sequencing situation (N , σS, p, α). Then, we show that the two corresponding
sets of optimal processing orders are equal. Finally, the fact that the algorithm always
selects a unique processing order among the set of all optimal processing orders
(property (iv)) completes the proof.
Note that A(σS, S ∪ {i}) ⊆ A(σ0, S ∪ {i}) and thus
min
σ∈A(σ0,S∪{i})
∑
j∈S∪{i}
α j C j (σ )) ≤ min
σ∈A(σS ,S∪{i})
∑
j∈S∪{i}
α j C j (σ )). (2)
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Moreover, from Lemma 3.3 we know that for all k ∈ S ∪ {i} we have c(k, S ∪
{i}, σS∪{i}) ≥ c(k, S ∪ {i}, σS) and thus σS∪{i} ∈ A(σS, S ∪ {i}). As a consequence,
since
∑
j∈S∪{i}
α j C j (σS∪{i}) = min
σ∈A(σ0,S∪{i})
∑
j∈S∪{i}
α j C j (σ ),
we have together with (2) that
min
σ∈A(σ0,S∪{i})
∑
j∈S∪{i}
α j C j (σ ) = min
σ∈A(σS ,S∪{i})
∑
j∈S∪{i}
α j C j (σ ). (3)
Let O(σ0, S ∪ {i}) and O(σS, S ∪ {i}) denote the set of optimal processing orders for
coalition S∪{i} in sequencing situations (N , σ0, p, α) and (N , σS, p, α), respectively.
We will show O(σ0, S ∪ {i}) = O(σS, S ∪ {i}).
First, take σ ∗ ∈ O(σS, S ∪ {i}). Since A(σS, S ∪ {i}) ⊆ A(σ0, S ∪ {i}), we have
σ ∗ ∈ A(σ0, S ∪ {i}). Moreover, due to (3), we also have σ ∗ ∈ O(σ0, S ∪ {i}).
Second, take σ ∗ ∈ O(σ0, S ∪ {i}). From property (iv) of the algorithm we know
that for all k ∈ S ∪ {i} we have c(k, S ∪ {i}, σ ∗) ≥ c(k, S ∪ {i}, σS∪{i}). Therefore,
together with c(k, S ∪{i}, σS∪{i}) ≥ c(k, S ∪{i}, σS) from Lemma 3.3, we know σ ∗ ∈
A(σS, S∪{i}). Consequently, together with (3), we can conclude σ ∗ ∈ O(σS, S∪{i}).
Hence, we have
O(σ0, S ∪ {i}) = O(σS, S ∪ {i}).
Finally, since the algorithm chooses among all optimal processing orders the order
in which the players are in a component to the left as far as possible and because
the algorithm chooses a fixed order within the components (property (iv)), we have
σS∪{i} = Alg((N , σS, p, α), S ∪ {i}). unionsq
It readily follows from the previous theorem that all players in a component to
the right of player i with respect to σS are not moved to a different component when
applying the algorithm to one-machine sequencing situation (N , σS, p, α) and coali-
tion S ∪ {i}. This is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.5 Let (N , σ0, p, α) be a one-machine sequencing situation, let S  N
with S 
= ∅ and let i ∈ N\S be such that (S ∪ {i})σ0c(i,S∪{i},σ0) = {i}. Then for all
k ∈ S ∩ F(σS, i) we have
c
(
k, S ∪ {i}, σS∪{i}
) = c (k, S ∪ {i}, σS) .
The next proposition states that all players in a component to the left of player i
with respect to σS are, if they are moved by the algorithm, moved componentwise at
least as far as the original component of player i in σ0. As a consequence, all players
that are in σS∪{i} to the left of the original component of player i in σ0, are not moved
by the algorithm when going from σS to σS∪{i}.
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Proposition 3.6 Let (N , σ0, p, α) be a one-machine sequencing situation, let S  N
with S 
= ∅ and let i ∈ N\S be such that (S ∪ {i})σ0c(i,S∪{i},σ0) = {i}.
(i) For all k ∈ S with c(k, S ∪ {i}, σS∪{i}) > c(k, S ∪ {i}, σS) we have
c(k, S ∪ {i}, σS∪{i}) ≥ c(i, S ∪ {i}, σ0),
(ii) For all k ∈ S with c(k, S ∪ {i}, σS∪{i}) < c(i, S ∪ {i}, σ0) we have
c(k, S ∪ {i}, σS∪{i}) = c(k, S ∪ {i}, σS).
The previous proposition follows directly from the following, more technical,
lemma. This lemma shows that, when applying the algorithm to one-machine sequenc-
ing situation (N , σS, p, α) and coalition S ∪ {i}, once a predecessor of player i with
respect to σS is considered by the algorithm, moving this player to a position that is
to the left of the original component of player i in σ0 is never beneficial.
Lemma 3.7 Let (N , σ0, p, α) be a one-machine sequencing situation, let S  N with
S 
= ∅ and let i ∈ N\S be such that (S ∪ {i})σ0c(i,S∪{i},σ0) = {i}. Let m ∈ S ∩ P(σS, i)
and l ∈ S ∩ F(τm, m) with c(l, S ∪ {i}, τm) < c(i, S ∪ {i}, σ0). Then
α(S∪{i})τm (m,l] pm − αm pN τm (m,l] ≤ 0, (4)
where τm denotes the processing order during the run of the algorithm for one-machine
sequencing situation (N , σS, p, α) and coalition S ∪ {i} just before player m is con-
sidered.
Proof See Appendix B. unionsq
4 On the convexity of SoSi sequencing games
A game v ∈ TUN is called convex if
v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T ), (5)
for all S, T ∈ 2N\{∅}, i ∈ N such that S ⊂ T ⊆ N\{i}, i.e., the incentive for joining
a coalition increases as the coalition grows. Using recursive arguments it can be seen
that in order to prove convexity it is sufficient to show (5) for the case |T | = |S| + 1
which boils down to
v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) ≤ v(S ∪ { j} ∪ {i}) − v(S ∪ { j}), (6)
for all S ∈ 2N\{∅}, i, j ∈ N and i 
= j such that S ⊆ N\{i, j}.
The main result of this paper is the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1 Let (N , σ0, p, α) be a one-machine sequencing situation and let (N , v)
be the corresponding SoSi sequencing game. Then, (N , v) is convex.
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Before presenting the formal proof of our main result, we highlight some of its
important aspects beforehand. Using (6), let S ∈ 2N \{∅}, i, j ∈ N and let i 
= j be
such that S ⊆ N\{i, j}.
Note that without loss of generality we can assume
– Assumption 1: σ0( j) < σ0(i).
– Assumption 2: (S∪{ j}∪{i})σ0c( j,S∪{ j}∪{i},σ0) = { j} and (S∪{ j}∪{i})
σ0
c(i,S∪{ j}∪{i},σ0)= {i}.
The first assumption is harmless because of the symmetric role of i and j in (6). The
second assumption states that player i and j both are the only player in the component
of S ∪ { j} ∪ {i} with respect to σ0. In theory this is no restriction since it is always
possible to add dummy players with zero processing times and zero costs per time unit
(a more formal explanation can be found in Appendix C). This assumption facilitates
the comparison of the marginal contribution of player i to coalition S and the marginal
contribution of player i to coalition S∪{ j}. For example, if one determines the optimal
processing order for coalition S ∪{i} via initial processing order σS and player i is the
only player in its component of S ∪ { j} ∪ {i} with respect to σ0 (and thus also with
respect to σS), then the players of coalition S ∪ {i} are in every component already
ordered with respect to their urgency and thus the preprocessing step of the algorithm
can be skipped. As a consequence, the marginal contribution of player i to coalition S
can be written as the sum of the positive cost difference of the players who are moved
by the algorithm to a different component.
In order to denote the different types of players that are moved, we introduce
the following notation. For U ∈ 2N\{∅} and k ∈ N such that U ⊆ N\{k} and
(U ∪ {k})σ0c(k,U∪{k},σ0) = {k}, let Mk(U ) denote the set of players who are moved to
a different component during the run of the algorithm with respect to one-machine
sequencing situation (N , σU , p, α) and coalition U ∪ {k}. Since the algorithm only
moves players to components that are to the right of its original component in σU , we
have
Mk(U ) = {l ∈ N | c(l, σU∪{k}) > c(l, σU )
}
.
As the algorithm only moves the players of the coalition U ∪{k} and all players outside
this coalition are not moved, we have
Mk(U ) ⊆ (U ∪ {k}) . (7)
Moreover, from Propositions 3.5 and 3.6 it follows, respectively, that
Mk(U ) ⊆ (P(σU , k) ∪ {k}) , (8)
and
c(l, σU∪{k}) ≥ c(k, σU ), (9)
for all l ∈ Mk(U ).
In order to prove Theorem 4.1 we need to compare the marginal contribution of
player i to coalition S and the marginal contribution of player i to coalition S ∪{ j}. As
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argued above, both marginal contributions can be written as the sum of the positive cost
differences of the players who are moved by the algorithm to a different component.
In order to compare those cost differences more easily, we first partition the players in
Mi (S), based on their position in the processing orders σS and σS∪{ j}, in four subsets.
Second, we derive from σS a special processing order σ in such a way that all players
from Mi (S) are in σ and σS∪{ j} in the same component. The convexity proof is finished
by means of adequately comparing all positive cost differences.
Proof of Theorem 4.1 Let S ∈ 2N\{∅}, i, j ∈ N and i 
= j such that S ⊆ N\{i, j}.
We will prove
v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) ≤ v(S ∪ { j} ∪ {i}) − v(S ∪ { j}). (10)
We partition the players in Mi (S), based on their position in the processing orders
σS and σS∪{ j}, in four subsets. First, note that from (7) it follows that Mi (S) ⊆ S ∪{i}
and thus j /∈ Mi (S). From (8) it follows that all players in Mi (S) are in σS to the left
of player i , or player i himself. By assumption 1 we have that player j is to the left
of player i in σ0 (and thus also in σS). So, we can split Mi (S) into the following two
disjoint sets:
– Mi1(S): the set of players in Mi (S) who are in σS to the left of player j ,
– Mi2(S): the set of players in Mi (S) who are in σS between player j and player i ,
or player i himself.
Based on the position in σS∪{ j}, we can split Mi1(S) into another three disjoint subsets:
– Mi1a(S): the set of players in M
i
1(S) who are in σS∪{ j} to the left of the original
component of player j ,
– Mi1b(S): the set of players in M
i
1(S) who are in σS∪{ j} between the original com-
ponents of player j and player i , or in the original component of player j ,
– Mi1c(S): the set of players in M
i
1(S) who are in σS∪{ j} to the right of the original
component of player i .
From Proposition 3.5 it follows that all players in Mi2(S) are in σS∪{ j} between
the original components of player j and player i , so we do not further split
Mi2(S) into subsets. We have now a partition of Mi (S) in four subsets, namely
{Mi1a(S), Mi1b(S), Mi1c(S), Mi2(S)}. Moreover, if i ∈ Mi (S) then i ∈ Mi2(S).
The definition of the partition of Mi (S) in four subsets explains the position
of the corresponding players in the processing orders σS and σS∪{ j}. The follow-
ing four claims indicate how the partition also determines the position in the two
other processing orders σS∪{i} and σS∪{ j}∪{i}. For notational convenience, we denote
c(k, S ∪ {i} ∪ { j}, σ ) by c(k, σ ) for every k ∈ S ∪ {i} ∪ { j} and σ ∈ (N ).
– Claim 1 c(k, σS∪{ j}∪{i}) = c(k, σS∪{i}) ≥ c(i, σS) for all k ∈ Mi (S).
– Claim 2 c(k, σS∪{ j}∪{i}) = c(k, σS∪{ j}) for all k ∈ Mi1c(S).
– Claim 3 c(k, σS) = c(k, σS∪{ j}) for all k ∈ Mi2(S).
– Claim 4 c(k, σS) = c(k, σS∪{ j}) for all k ∈ Mi1a(S).
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c(j, σS)/player j c(i, σS)/player i
Mi1a(S)
Mi1b(S)
Mi1c(S)
Mi2(S)
c(j, σS)/player j c(i, σS) player i
Mi1a(S)
Mi1b(S)
Mi1c(S)
Mi2(S)
c(j, σS) player j c(i, σS)/player i player j
Mi1a(S)
Mi1b(S)
Mi1c(S)
Mi2(S)
c(j, σS) c(i, σS) player i player jplayer j
Mi1a(S)
Mi1b(S)
Mi1c(S)
Mi2(S)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Fig. 10 The position of the players in Mi (S) in the four different processing orders. a Processing order
σS . b Processing order σS∪{i}. c Processing order σS∪{ j}. d Processing order σS∪{ j}∪{i}
The proofs of these four claims can be found in Appendix D. Figure 10 illustrates for all
four partition elements of Mi (S) its position with respect to the original components of
player i and player j in the four different processing orders. The solid arrows give the
original components and/or the actual positions of player i and j . The dotted arrows
give possible positions of player i or j .
We defineσ ∈ (N ) as the unique urgency respecting processing order that satisfies
(i) for all k ∈ Mi (S):
c(k, σ ) = c(k, σS∪{ j}), (11)
(ii) for all k ∈ S\Mi (S):
c(k, σ ) = c(k, σS),
(iii) for all k, l ∈ S with c(k, σ ) = c(l, σ ):
uk = ul , σ0(k) < σ0(l) ⇒ σ(k) < σ(l).
Note that conditions (i) and (ii) determine the components for the players in S. Next,
the urgency respecting requirement determines the order within the components for
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σS σ σS∪{i}
Note: the players in M i1c(S) are in σ already in the component
they are in in σS∪{i}, but the players in M i1b(S) not yet.
Move the players in M i1b(S) and M
i
1c(S)
to the components they are in in σS∪{j}.
Move the players in M i1a(S), M
i
1b(S) and M
i
2(S)
to the components they are in in σS∪{i}, i.e., to
the right of the original component of player i.
Fig. 11 Overview how to obtain σS∪{i} from σS via σ
c(j, σS)/player j c(i, σS)/player i
Mi1a(S)
Mi1b(S)
Mi1c(S)
Mi2(S)
Fig. 12 The position of the players in Mi (S) in σ
the players with different urgencies. Finally, in case there is a tie for the urgency of two
players in the same component, item (iii) states a tiebreaking rule. As a consequence,
due to this tiebreaking rule, we have that σ is unique.
Note that σ can be considered as a temporary processing order when going from
σS to σS∪{i} (cf. Fig. 11). The processing order σ is derived from processing order σS
in such a way that all players from Mi (S) are in σ and σS∪{ j} in the same component.
From Claim 3 and 4 it follows that the players in Mi1a(S) and M
i
2(S) are in σS and
σS∪{ j} in the same component and thus those players do not need to be moved. Hence,
only the players in Mi1b(S) and M
i
1c(S) need to be moved. Hence, we start from σS and
we move all players in Mi1b(S) and M
i
1c(S) to the components they are in in σS∪{ j}.
Note that since the tiebreaking rule mentioned in condition (iii) is the same tiebreaking
rule as in property (iv) of the algorithm, the mutual order of the players in Mi (S) is
in σ the same as in σS∪{ j}.
An illustration of the position of the players in Mi (S) in σ can be found in Fig. 12.
Note that since i /∈ S ∪ { j} it follows that c(i, σS) = c(i, σS∪{ j}). Moreover, we
note that σ and σS∪{ j} are not necessarily equal to each other as the players in
M j (S)\Mi (S) are in σ and σS∪{ j} in different components. However, as the players
in M j (S) will be moved to a component to the right when going from σS to σS∪{ j}, we
have
c(k, σS∪{ j}) ≥ c(k, σ ), (12)
for all k ∈ S ∪ { j} ∪ {i}.
Now we consider the transition from σ to σS∪{i} and its corresponding cost differ-
ences. Since the players in Mi1c(S) are in σ already in the component they are in in
σS∪{i}, only all players in Mi1a(S), Mi1b(S) and M
i
2(S) need to be moved to a com-
ponent to the right when going from σ to σS∪{i} (see also Fig. 11). We go from σ to
σS∪{i} by considering the players in Mi1a(S), Mi1b(S) and M
i
2(S) in an order reverse
to the order they are in σ , i.e., the players are considered from the right to the left.
For k ∈ Mi1a(S) ∪ Mi1b(S) ∪ Mi2(S), denote the processing order just before player k
is moved by τ k and let rk denote the player that player k will be moved behind. The
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cost difference for coalition S ∪ {i} due to moving this player, when going from σ to
σS∪{i}, is denoted by δk , i.e.,
δk = α(S∪{i})τk (k,rk ] pk − αk pN τk (k,rk ].
Similarly, we can write the marginal contribution of player i to coalition S ∪ { j} as
the sum of positive cost differences of the players in Mi (S ∪ { j}). We go from σS∪{ j}
to σS∪{ j}∪{i} by considering the players in Mi (S ∪{ j}) in an order reverse to the order
they are in σS∪{ j}, i.e., the players are considered from the right to the left. We note that
since the mutual order of the players in Mi (S) is the same in σ and σS∪{ j}, the order in
which the players in Mi1a(S)∪ Mi1b(S)∪ Mi2(S) are considered when going from σ to
σS∪{i} is the same as the order in which they are considered when going from σS∪{ j}
to σS∪{ j}∪{i}. For k ∈ Mi (S ∪ { j}), denote the processing order just before player k
is moved by τk and let rk denote the player that player k will be moved behind. The
cost difference for coalition S ∪ { j} ∪ {i} due to moving this player, when going from
σS∪{ j} to σS∪{ j}∪{i}, is denoted by δk , i.e.,
δk = α(S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ] pk − αk pN τk (k,rk ].
From (12) together with the fact that the players in Mi1a(S) ∪ Mi1b(S) ∪ Mi2(S) are
moved to the same component in σS∪{i} and σS∪{ j}∪{i}, and the fact that the players in
M j (S)\Mi (S) are moved to a component to the right, we have
c(l, τk) ≥ c(l, τ k), (13)
for all k ∈ Mi1a(S) ∪ Mi1b(S) ∪ Mi2(S) and l ∈ S ∪ { j} ∪ {i}.
The following claim states that the cost savings when moving a player in Mi1a(S)∪
Mi1b(S)∪ Mi2(S) when going from σ to σS∪{i} is at most the cost savings when moving
the same player when going from σS∪{ j} to σS∪{ j}∪{i}.
– Claim 5 δk ≤ δk for all k ∈ Mi1a(S) ∪ Mi1b(S) ∪ Mi2(S).
Proof The proof can be found in Appendix E.
We are now ready to prove (10). Note that a detailed explanation of the subsequent
equalities and inequalities can be found after the equations.
v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)
(i)=
∑
k∈P(σ0,i)∩F(σS ,i)
αi pk + C(σS, S ∪ {i}) − C(σS∪{i}, S ∪ {i})
(ii)=
∑
k∈P(σ0,i)∩F(σS ,i)
αi pk + C(σS, S ∪ {i}) − C(σ , S ∪ {i})
+ C(σ , S ∪ {i}) − C(σS∪{i}, S ∪ {i})
(iii)=
∑
k∈P(σ0,i)∩F(σS ,i)
αi pk + C(σS, S) − C(σ , S) +
∑
k∈Mi1c(S)
αi pk
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+ C(σ , S ∪ {i}) − C(σS∪{i}, S ∪ {i})
(iv)≤
∑
k∈P(σ0,i)∩F(σS ,i)
αi pk +
∑
k∈Mi1c(S)
αi pk + C(σ , S ∪ {i}) − C(σS∪{i}, S ∪ {i})
(v)=
∑
k∈P(σ0,i)∩F(σS ,i)
αi pk +
∑
k∈Mi1c(S)
αi pk +
∑
k∈Mi1a(S)∪Mi1b(S)∪Mi2(S)
δk
(vi)≤
∑
k∈P(σ0,i)∩F(σS ,i)
αi pk +
∑
k∈Mi1c(S)
αi pk +
∑
k∈Mi1a(S)∪Mi1b(S)∪Mi2(S)
δk
(vii)≤
∑
k∈P(σ0,i)∩F(σS ,i)
αi pk +
∑
k∈Mi1c(S)
αi pk +
∑
k∈Mi (S∪{ j})
δk
(viii)=
∑
k∈P(σ0,i)∩F(σS ,i)
αi pk +
∑
k∈Mi1c(S)
αi pk
+ C(σS∪{ j}, S ∪ { j} ∪ {i}) − C(σS∪{ j}∪{i}, S ∪ { j} ∪ {i})
(ix)≤
∑
k∈P(σ0,i)∩F(σS ,i)
αi pk +
∑
k∈P(σS ,i)∩F(σS∪{ j},i)
αi pk
+ C(σS∪{ j}, S ∪ { j} ∪ {i}) − C(σS∪{ j}∪{i}, S ∪ { j} ∪ {i})
(x)=
∑
k∈P(σ0,i)∩F(σS∪{ j},i)
αi pk + C(σS∪{ j}, S ∪ { j} ∪ {i}) − C(σS∪{ j}∪{i}, S ∪ { j} ∪ {i})
(xi)= v(S ∪ { j} ∪ {i}) − v(S ∪ { j}),
which proves (10).
Explanations
(i) The extra worth that is obtained by adding player i to coalition S can be split
into two parts. The first part is due to the fact that player i joins the coalition and
it represents the cost savings for player i in processing order σS compared to σ0.
The completion time of player i is reduced by the sum of the processing times of
the players that jumped over player i when going from σ0 to σS without moving
any players. The second part represents the cost savings for coalition S ∪ {i}
by additionally moving players when going from σS to the optimal processing
order σS∪{i}.
(ii) The optimal processing order σS∪{i} can be obtained from σS via σ where some
players are already (partially) moved to the right.
(iii) The cost difference for coalition S∪{i} when going from σS to σ can be split into
two parts: the cost difference for coalition S and the cost difference for player i .
By the definition of σ and since i /∈ S ∪ { j}, player i is not moved when going
from σS to σ and the completion time of player i is reduced by the sum of the
processing times of the players that jumped over player i when going from σS
to σ , i.e., the sum of the processing times of the players in Mi1c(S).
(iv) Processing order σS is optimal for coalition S and thus C(σS, S)−C(σ , S) ≤ 0.
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(v) This follows from the definition of δk .
(vi) This follows from Claim 5.
(vii) This follows from (Mi1a(S) ∪ Mi1b(S) ∪ Mi2(S)) ⊆ Mi (S ∪ { j}) (cf. Fig. 10)
and δk > 0 for all k ∈ Mi (S ∪ { j}) due to property (ii) of the algorithm.
(viii) This follows from the definition of δk .
(ix) This follows from Mi1c(S) ⊆ (P(σS, i) ∩ F(σS∪{ j}, i)) (cf. Fig. 10).
(x) The group of players that jump over player i when going from σ0 to σS∪{ j}
can be split into two groups: the group of players that jumped over player
i when going from σ0 to σS and the group of players that were positioned
in front of player i in σS but jumped over player i when going from σS to
σS∪{ j}. Hence, {P(σ0, i) ∩ F(σS, i), P(σS, i) ∩ F(σS∪{ j}, i)} is a partition of
P(σ0, i) ∩ F(σS∪{ j}, i).
(xi) Similar to the explanation in (i).
To conclude, we have shown v(S ∪{i})− v(S) ≤ v(S ∪{ j}∪ {i})− v(S ∪{ j}) which
proves the convexity of SoSi sequencing games. unionsq
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Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 3.3
In this proof we denote c(k, S ∪ {i}, σ ) by c(k, σ ) for every k ∈ S ∪ {i} and every
σ ∈ (N ). We prove the lemma with the help of the algorithm. First, note that
because player i is the only player in its component in σ0, we have σ S0 = σ S∪{i}0 ,
i.e., the processing orders are the same after the preprocessing step of the algorithm.
Therefore, if we go from σ0 to the optimal processing orders σS and σS∪{i}, then
the steps performed by the algorithm are the same up to the moment that player i is
considered. Moreover, since the players are considered in reverse order with respect
to σ S0 , we have
c(k, σS∪{i}) = c(k, σS), (14)
for all k ∈ S ∩ F(σ S0 , i). Hence, it remains to be proven that also for the players in
S ∩ P(σ S0 , i) the lemma is true.
Let player m ∈ S be the closest predecessor of player i with respect to σ S0 for which
the lemma is not true, i.e.,
c(m, σS∪{i}) < c(m, σS),
and
c(k, σS∪{i}) ≥ c(k, σS),
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for all k ∈ S ∩ F(σ S0 , m) ∩ P(σ S0 , i). We will derive a contradiction. We continue
the proof as follows. We look to which component player m will be moved to by
the algorithm with respect to coalition S. Then, there is a specific player who is in a
component with index at least as high as the component that player m is moved to
by the algorithm with respect to coalition S. We show that moving player m behind
this specific player is actually more beneficial with respect to coalition S ∪ {i}, which
contradicts the optimality of the algorithm.
Denote the processing order when player m is considered by the algorithm with
respect to coalition S by τ S and with respect to coalition S ∪ {i} by τ S∪{i}. Let r S
denote the player that player m will be moved behind with respect to coalition S
according to the algorithm. Similarly, let r S∪{i} denote the player that player m will
be moved behind with respect to coalition S ∪ {i} according to the algorithm. Note
that in case player m is not moved by the algorithm with respect to coalition S ∪ {i},
then we define player r S∪{i} as player m. Since c(m, σS∪{i}) = c(r S∪{i}, τ S∪{i}) and
c(m, σS) = c(r S, τ S), we have
c
(
r S∪{i}, τ S∪{i}
)
< c(r S, τ S). (15)
As we will see later (S ∪ {i})σ0,τ S
c(r S∪{i},τ S∪{i}) 
= ∅, let r˜ S ∈ (S ∪ {i})σ0,τ
S
c(r S∪{i},τ S∪{i}) be
such that player m would be moved behind this player in case player m is moved to
component (S ∪ {i})σ0,τ S
c(r S∪{i},τ S∪{i}) according to the algorithm with respect to coalition
S . Note that player r˜ S is unique because the algorithm always selects a unique player
per component. Note that player r˜ S might also be player i as in this way we make
sure that player r˜ S also exists if c(r S∪{i}, τ S∪{i}) = c(i, σ0).3 Note that in case players
m and r S∪{i} coincide (that means that player m is not moved by the algorithm with
respect to coalition S ∪ {i}), then we define player r˜ S as player m.
Since player m is moved behind player r S and not behind player r˜ S , we have due
to property (v) of the algorithm that
αSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] pm − αm pN τ S (r˜ S ,r S ] > 0. (16)
We distinguish between two cases:
– Case A: {k ∈ S | σ S0 (m) < σ S0 (k) < σ S0 (i)} = ∅,
– Case B: {k ∈ S | σ S0 (m) < σ S0 (k) < σ S0 (i)} 
= ∅.
Case A [{k ∈ S | σ S0 (m) < σ S0 (k) < σ S0 (i)} 
= ∅]
Hence, there are no players of coalition S in between player m and player i in σ S0 .
Then, from (14) it follows that for every k ∈ S ∩ F(τ S, m) we have
c(k, τ S) = c(k, τ S∪{i}). (17)
3 Note that in case c(r S∪{i}, τ S∪{i}) = c(i, σ0), it is not admissible for the algorithm to move player m to
component (S ∪ {i})σ0,τ S
c(r S∪{i},τ S∪{i}) due to requirement (ii) of admissibility, but this is no problem as also
in this case the upcoming arguments are still valid.
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Note that this implies that (S ∪ {i})σ0,τ S
c(r S∪{i},τ S∪{i}) is non-empty.
We will prove that moving player m behind player r S is more beneficial than moving
player m behind player r S∪{i}, i.e., we will prove that
α
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},r S ] pm − αm pN τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},r S ] > 0. (18)
This would imply that the step made by the algorithm for player m when applied on
coalition S ∪ {i} is not optimal, which contradicts the optimality of the algorithm.
Hence, for Case A, it remains to prove (18).
We distinguish from now on between the following four cases:
– Case A.1: i /∈ N τ S (r˜ S, r S] and i /∈ N τ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, r S],
– Case A.2: i ∈ N τ S (r˜ S, r S] and i /∈ N τ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, r S],
– Case A.3: i ∈ N τ S (r˜ S, r S] and i ∈ N τ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, r S],
– Case A.4: i /∈ N τ S (r˜ S, r S] and i ∈ N τ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, r S].
Case A.1 [i /∈ N τ S (r˜ S, r S] and i /∈ N τ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, r S]]
Note that this case occurs if r S∪{i} 
= m and player i is not necessarily moved by the
algorithm with respect to coalition S ∪ {i}. Then, it follows from (17) together with
the fact c(r˜ S, τ S) = c(r S∪{i}, τ S∪{i}) that
α
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},r S ] pm−αm pN τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},r S ]=αSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] pm − αm pN τ S (r˜ S ,r S ]
(16)
> 0.
Case A.2 [i ∈ N τ S (r˜ S, r S] and i /∈ N τ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, r S]]
Note that this case occurs if r S∪{i} = m and player i has been moved by the algorithm
with respect to coalition S∪{i} such that τ S∪{i}(i) > τ S∪{i}(r S). Then, using the same
arguments as in Case A.1, we have
α
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},r S ] pm − αm pN τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},r S ]
= αSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] pm − αm pN τ S (r˜ S ,r S ] + αm pi
(16)
> 0.
Case A.3 [i ∈ N τ S (r˜ S, r S] and i ∈ N τ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, r S]]
Note that this case occurs if r S∪{i} = m and player i has either not been moved
by the algorithm with respect to coalition S ∪ {i} or it has been moved such that
τ S∪{i}(i) < τ S∪{i}(r S). Then, using the same arguments as in Case A.1, we have
α
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},r S ] pm − αm pN τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},r S ]
= αSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] pm − αm pN τ S (r˜ S ,r S ] + αi pm
(16)
> 0.
Case A.4 [i /∈ N τ S (r˜ S, r S] and i ∈ N τ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, r S]]
Note that this case occurs if r S∪{i} 
= m and player i has been moved by the algorithm
with respect to coalition S ∪ {i} such that τ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}) < τ S∪{i}(i) < τ S∪{i}(r S).
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Then, using the same arguments as in Case A.1, we have
α
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},r S ] pm − αm pN τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},r S ]
= αSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] pm − αm pN τ S (r˜ S ,r S ] + αi pm − αm pi .
If we can show that αi pm − αm pi > 0, (18) follows.
Let rˆ S be the direct predecessor of player i in τ S∪{i}. Since player i is moved behind
player rˆ S and not behind player r S , we have due to the optimality of the algorithm
that
α
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (i,r S ] pi − αi pN τ S∪{i} (i,r S ] ≤ 0.
Consequently, it follows from (17) together with the fact c(rˆ S, τ S) = c(i, τ S∪{i}) that
we also have
αSτ S (rˆ S ,r S ] pi − αi pN τ S (rˆ S ,r S ] ≤ 0.
Therefore, together with (16), we can conclude αipi >
αm
pm , i.e., αi pm − αm pi > 0.
Case B [{k ∈ S | σ S0 (m) < σ S0 (k) < σ S0 (i)} 
= ∅]
Hence, there are players of coalition S in between player m and player i in σ S0 .
Therefore, due to the definition of player m, it follows that for every k ∈ S with
σ S0 (m) < σ
S
0 (k) < σ
S
0 (i) we have
c(k, σS∪{i}) ≥ c(k, σS), (19)
i.e., the statement in the lemma holds for all followers of player m with respect to
σ S0 intersected with S ∩ P(σ S0 , i). First, note that (S ∪ {i})σ0,τ
S
c(r S∪{i},τ S∪{i}) is non-empty
because of the following. Due to requirement (i) and (ii) of admissibility we know that
the first player in (S ∪ {i})σ0,τ S∪{i}
c(r S∪{i},τ S∪{i}) with respect to τ
S∪{i} is also the first player in
(S∪{i})σ0,σ S0
c(r S∪{i},τ S∪{i}) with respect to σ
S
0 . Therefore, using (19) we know that this player
also belongs to (S ∪ {i})σ0,τ S
c(r S∪{i},τ S∪{i}). Hence, (S ∪ {i})σ0,τ
S
c(r S∪{i},τ S∪{i}) is non-empty.
Next, define player l ∈ Sτ S (r˜ S, r S] as the player in Sτ S (r˜ S, r S] who is positioned
last with respect to τ S∪{i}, i.e., τ S∪{i}(l) ≥ τ S∪{i}(k) for all k ∈ Sτ S (r˜ S, r S]. Note
that player l was actually player r S in Case A because of (17). From the assumptions
in (19) and (15) it follows that
c(l, τ S∪{i}) ≥ c(r S, τ S∪{i}) ≥ c(r S, τ S) > c(r S∪{i}, τ S∪{i}), (20)
i.e., player l is to the right of player r S∪{i} in τ S∪{i}. We will prove that moving player
m behind player l is more beneficial than moving player m behind player r S∪{i}, i.e.,
we will prove that
α
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l] pm − αm pN τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l] > 0. (21)
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This implies that the step made by the algorithm for player m when applied on coalition
S ∪ {i} is not optimal, which contradicts the optimality of the algorithm. Hence, for
Case B, it remains to prove (21).
From the definitions of players r˜ S and l, together with (19), it follows that
Sτ
S
(r˜ S, r S] ⊆ Sτ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, l] ⊆ (S ∪ {i})τ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, l]. (22)
Moreover, since during the run of the algorithm player m jumps over all players in
Sτ S (m, r S], Proposition (3.1) implies that
uk > um, (23)
for all k ∈ Sτ S (m, r S].
Below we distinguish between the following four cases:
– Case B.1: i /∈ N τ S (r˜ S, r S] and i /∈ N τ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, l],
– Case B.2: i ∈ N τ S (r˜ S, r S] and i /∈ N τ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, l],
– Case B.3: i ∈ N τ S (r˜ S, r S] and i ∈ N τ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, l],
– Case B.4: i /∈ N τ S (r˜ S, r S] and i ∈ N τ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, l].
Case B.1 [i /∈ N τ S (r˜ S, r S] and i /∈ N τ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, l]]
Using c(l, τ S∪{i}) ≥ c(r S, τ S) from (20), we distinguish between another two cases:
– Case B.1(i): c(l, τ S∪{i}) = c(r S, τ S),
– Case B.1(ii): c(l, τ S∪{i}) > c(r S, τ S).
Case B.1(i) [c(l, τ S∪{i}) = c(r S, τ S)]
Since r˜ S ∈ (S ∪ {i})σ0,τ S
c(r S∪{i},τ S∪{i}) and thus c(r˜
S, τ S) = c(r S∪{i}, τ S∪{i}), the assump-
tions i /∈ N τ S (r˜ S, r S] and c(l, τ S∪{i}) = c(r S, τ S) imply that
Sτ
S
(r˜ S, r S] = Sτ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, l] = (S ∪ {i})τ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, l]. (24)
For every k ∈ Sτ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, l]\Sτ S (r˜ S, r S] we know that k ∈ Sτ S (m, r˜ S], because
c(k, τ S) ≤ c(k, τ S∪{i}) by (19) and P(τ S, m) = P(τ S∪{i}, m). Hence, also k ∈
Sτ S (m, r S] and thus from (23) it follows that uk > um . Together with Proposition 3.2
applied on the set Sτ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, l]\Sτ S (r˜ S, r S] and player m we have
α
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l]\Sτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] pm − αm p(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l]\Sτ S (r˜ S ,r S ]
= αSτ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l]\Sτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] pm − αm pSτ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l]\Sτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] > 0, (25)
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where the equality follows from the assumption i /∈ N τ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, l]. As a conse-
quence,
α
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l] pm − αm pN τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l]
= α
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l] pm − αm
(
p
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l] + p(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l]
)
(24)= α
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l] pm − αm
(
p
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l] + pSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ]
)
(22)= αSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] pm − αm
(
pSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] + pSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ]
)
+ α
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l]\Sτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] pm − αm p(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l]\Sτ S (r˜ S ,r S ]
(25)≥ αSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] pm − αm
(
pSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] + pSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ]
)
(16)
> 0,
proving (21).
Case B.1(ii) [c(l, τ S∪{i}) > c(r S, τ S)]
Define Q as the set of players from Sτ S (r˜ S, r S] who are positioned in τ S∪{i} in a
component to the right of component (S ∪ {i})σ0,τ S∪{i}
c(r S ,τ S)
. Since c(l, τ S∪{i}) > c(r S, τ S)
and l ∈ Sτ S (r˜ S, r S], we have l ∈ Q and thus Q 
= ∅. Select from Q only the players
who have in their corresponding component in τ S∪{i} no players from Sτ S (r˜ S, r S] in
front of him and denote this set of players by Q, i.e., we select in each component a
player of Q (if possible) that is most to the left in τ S∪{i}.
Set Q = {q1, q2, . . . , q|Q|} such that c(qk, τ S∪{i}) < c(qk+1, τ S∪{i}) for all
k ∈ {1, . . . , |Q| − 1}. Define w1 as the first player in (S ∪ {i})σ0c(r S ,τ S), i.e., the direct
follower in τ S∪{i} of component (S ∪ {i})σ0,τ S∪{i}
c(r S ,τ S)
. For k ∈ {2, . . . , |Q|}, define wk
as the first player in (S ∪ {i})σ0c(qk−1,τ S∪{i}), i.e., the direct follower in τ S∪{i} of com-
ponent (S ∪ {i})σ0,τ S∪{i}
c(qk−1,τ S∪{i})
. Note that because of the definition of player l we have
c(q|Q|, τ S∪{i}) = c(l, τ S∪{i}).
The collection of sets {N τ S∪{i} [wk, qk) | k ∈ {1, . . . , |Q|}} are by definition mutually
disjoint. Moreover, for k ∈ {1, . . . , |Q|}, we have N τ S∪{i} [wk, qk) ∩ Sτ S (r˜ S, r S] = ∅
and (S ∪ {i})τ S∪{i} [wk, qk) ⊆ (S ∪ {i})τ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, l]. If we set R = Sτ S (r˜ S, r S] ∪⋃|Q|
k=1 (S ∪ {i})τ
S∪{i} [wk, qk), then using (22) we have
R ⊆ (S ∪ {i})τ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, l], (26)
and
αR = αSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] +
|Q|∑
k=1
α
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} [wk ,qk ), (27)
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and
pR = pSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] +
|Q|∑
k=1
p
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} [wk ,qk ). (28)
Note, for k ∈ {1, . . . , |Q|}, we have c(qk, σ0) ≤ c(qk, τ S) ≤ c(r S, τ S). Hence, as
wk is in τ S∪{i} to the right of component (S ∪{i})σ0,τ S∪{i}c(r S ,τ S) , we have that it is admissible
to move player qk in front of wk with respect to τ S∪{i}. In other words, it is admissible to
move player qk to the tail of component (S∪{i})σ0,τ S∪{i}c(qk−1,τ S∪{i}) (and the tail of component
(S ∪ {i})σ0,τ S∪{i}
c(r S ,τ S)
in case k = 1). Since player qk is not moved behind player wk , we
have due to property (v) of the algorithm that
α
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} [wk ,qk ) pqk − αqk pN τ S∪{i} [wk ,qk ) > 0.
Moreover, since qk ∈ Sτ S (m, r S] it follows from (23) that um < uqk . As a conse-
quence,
α
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} [wk ,qk ) pm − αm pN τ S∪{i} [wk ,qk ) > 0. (29)
We have
αR pm − αm
(
pR + p(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l]
)
(27),(28)=
⎛
⎝αSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] +
|Q|∑
k=1
α
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} [wk ,qk )
⎞
⎠ pm
−αm
⎛
⎝pSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] +
|Q|∑
k=1
p
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} [wk ,qk ) + p(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},w1) + p(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} [w1,l]
⎞
⎠
see below=
⎛
⎝αSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] +
|Q|∑
k=1
α
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} [wk ,qk )
⎞
⎠ pm
−αm
⎛
⎝pSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] +
|Q|∑
k=1
p
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} [wk ,qk ) + pSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] +
|Q|∑
k=1
p
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} [wk ,qk )
⎞
⎠
=
⎛
⎝αSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] +
|Q|∑
k=1
α
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} [wk ,qk )
⎞
⎠ pm − αm
⎛
⎝pN τ S (r˜ S ,r S ] +
|Q|∑
k=1
pN τ S∪{i} [wk ,qk )
⎞
⎠
(16),(29)
> 0. (30)
Note that the second equality follows from c(r˜ S, τ S) = c(r S∪{i}, τ S∪{i}), the fact that
w1 is the direct follower in τ S∪{i} of component (S ∪ {i})σ0,τ S∪{i}c(r S ,τ S) , and the assump-
tion i /∈ N τ S (r˜ S, r S]. Moreover, the collection of sets {(S ∪ {i})τ S∪{i} [wk, qk) | k ∈
{1, . . . , |Q|}} forms a partition of the set (S ∪ {i})τ S∪{i} [w1, l].
For every k ∈ Sτ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, l]\R, we know that either k ∈ Sτ S (m, r˜ S] or
c(k, τ S) ≥ c(r S, τ S). If k ∈ Sτ S (m, r˜ S], then also k ∈ Sτ S (m, r S] and thus from (23)
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we have uk > um . Next, if c(k, τ S) ≥ c(r S, τ S), then because c(l, τ S) ≤ c(r S, τ S) we
know that the swap of players k and l with respect to τ S∪{i} is admissible. Therefore,
according to Proposition 3.1, we know uk ≥ ul . Moreover, since l ∈ Sτ S (m, r S], it
follows from (23) that um < ul . As a consequence, um < uk . Together with Proposi-
tion 3.2 applied on the set Sτ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, l]\R and player m we have
α
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l]\R pm − αm p(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l]\R
= αSτ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l]\R pm − αm pSτ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l]\R > 0, (31)
where the equality follows from the assumption i /∈ N τ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, l]. As a conse-
quence,
α
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l] pm − αm pN τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l]
= α
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l] pm − αm
(
p
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l] + p(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l]
)
(26)= αR pm − αm
(
pR + p(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l]
)
+ α
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l]\R pm − αm p(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l]\R
(30),(31)
> 0,
proving (21).
Case B.2 [i ∈ N τ S (r˜ S, r S] and i /∈ N τ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, l]]
Note that this case occurs exactly if c(r˜ S, τ S) < c(i, σ0) < c(r S, τ S) and player i has
been moved by the algorithm with respect to coalition S ∪ {i}, such that τ S∪{i}(i) >
τ S∪{i}(l). We have
αSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] pm − αm pN τ S (r˜ S ,r S ]\{i} = αSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] pm − αm pN τ S (r˜ S ,r S ] + αm pi
(16)
> 0.
(32)
Then, using the same arguments as in Case B.1, we can prove (21). Namely, where
we used (16) in Case B.1, we now use the above equation. Hence, player i has already
been taken into account and thus for using the same arguments as in Case B.1 we can
assume i /∈ N τ S (r˜ S, r S] and i /∈ N τ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, l].
For example, analogous to Case B.1(i), Case B.2(i) goes as follows. Since r˜ S ∈ (S∪
{i})σ0,τ S
c(r S∪{i},τ S∪{i}) and thus c(r˜
S, τ S) = c(r S∪{i}, τ S∪{i}), the assumption c(l, τ S∪{i}) =
c(r S, τ S) implies that
Sτ
S
(r˜ S, r S]\{i} = Sτ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, l] = (S ∪ {i})τ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, l]. (33)
Using exactly the same arguments as in Case B.1(i), we have
α
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l]\Sτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] pm − αm p(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l]\Sτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] > 0. (34)
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As a consequence,
α
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l] pm − αm pN τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l]
= α
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l] pm − αm
(
p
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l] + p(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l]
)
(33)= α
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l] pm − αm
(
p
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l] + pSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ]\{i}
)
(22)= αSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] pm − αm
(
pSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] + pSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ]\{i}
)
+ α
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l]\Sτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] pm − αm p(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (r S∪{i},l]\Sτ S (r˜ S ,r S ]
(34)≥ αSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] pm − αm
(
pSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] + pSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ]\{i}
)
= αSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] pm − αm pN τ S (r˜ S ,r S ]\{i}
(32)
> 0,
proving (21).
Case B.3 [i ∈ N τ S (r˜ S, r S] and i ∈ N τ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, l]]
Note that this case occurs exactly if c(r˜ S, τ S) < c(i, σ0) < c(r S, τ S) and player i has
either not been moved by the algorithm with respect to coalition S ∪ {i} or it has been
moved such that τ S∪{i}(i) < τ S∪{i}(l). We have
αSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ]∪{i} pm − αm pN τ S (r˜ S ,r S ] = αSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] pm − αm pN τ S (r˜ S ,r S ] + αi pm
(16)
> 0.
Then, using the same arguments as in Case B.1, we can prove (21).
Case B.4 [i /∈ N τ S (r˜ S, r S] and i ∈ N τ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, l]]
Then,
αSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ]∪{i} pm − αm pN τ S (r˜ S ,r S ]∪{i} = αSτ S (r˜ S ,r S ] pm − αm pN τ S (r˜ S ,r S ]
+αi pm − αm pi .
It suffices to show that αi pm −αm pi > 0. Together with the above equation and (16),
we can prove (21) by using the same arguments as in Case B.1.
We distinguish between two cases:
– Case B.4(i): c(i, σ0) > c(r S, τ S),
– Case B.4(ii): c(i, σ0) < c(r˜ S, τ S).
Case B.4(i) [c(i, σ0) > c(r S, τ S)]
Note that this case occurs exactly if τ S∪{i}(i) < τ S∪{i}(l). This means that player i is
not necessarily moved by the algorithm with respect to coalition S ∪ {i}. Then,
c(l, σ0) ≤ c(l, τ S) ≤ c(r S, τ S) < c(i, σ0) ≤ c(i, τ S∪{i}) = c(i, σS∪{i}).
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Hence, the swap of players i and l with respect to σS∪{i} is admissible and thus,
according to Proposition 3.1, we have ui ≥ ul . Consequently, together with (23), we
have ui ≥ ul > um . Hence, αi pm − αm pi > 0.
Case B.4(ii) [c(i, σ0) < c(r˜ S, τ S)]
Note that this case occurs exactly if player i has been moved by the algorithm with
respect to coalition S ∪ {i} such that τ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}) < τ S∪{i}(i) < τ S∪{i}(l). Suppose
c(l, σ0) < c(i, σ0), then
c(l, σ0) < c(i, σ0) < c(r˜ S, τ S) = c(r S∪{i}, τ S∪{i}) = c(m, σS∪{i}).
Hence, the swap of players m and l with respect to σS∪{i} is admissible and thus,
according to Proposition 3.1, we have um ≥ ul . This is a contradiction with (23)
and thus we know c(l, σ0) > c(i, σ0). Therefore, using (14), we have c(l, τ S) =
c(l, τ S∪{i}) which implies l = r S . As a consequence, if k ∈ Sτ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, r S], then
also k ∈ Sτ S (m, r S] and thus from (23) we have um < uk . With the same arguments we
used for player l we can conclude c(k, σ0) > c(i, σ0) and thus c(k, τ S) = c(k, τ S∪{i}).
Therefore, we have
N τ
S
(r˜ S, r S] ∪ {i} = N τ S∪{i}(r S∪{i}, r S], (35)
and
c(k, τ S) = c(k, τ S∪{i}), (36)
for all k ∈ Sτ S (r˜ S, r S].
Let rˆ S be the direct predecessor of player i in τ S∪{i}. Since player i is in τ S∪{i}
behind player rˆ S and not behind player r S , although this is an admissible swap, we
have
α
(S∪{i})τ S∪{i} (i,r S ] pi − αi pN τ S∪{i} (i,r S ] ≤ 0.
Consequently, it follows from (35) and (36) together with the fact that c(rˆ S, τ S) =
c(i, τ S∪{i}), that
αSτ S (rˆ S ,r S ] pi − αi pN τ S (rˆ S ,r S ] ≤ 0.
Moreover, since player m is moved behind player r S and not behind player rˆ S , we
have due to property (v) of the algorithm that
αSτ S (rˆ S ,r S ] pm − αm pN τ S (rˆ S ,r S ] > 0.
Therefore, we can conclude αipi >
αm
pm , i.e., αi pm − αm pi > 0, which is exactly what
we needed.
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Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 3.7
In this proof we denote c(k, S ∪ {i}, σ ) by c(k, σ ) for every k ∈ S ∪ {i} and every
σ ∈ (N ). We continue the proof by means of induction on the number
nm = { j ∈ S | σS(m) < σS( j) < σS(i)} ,
i.e., the number of players in coalition S between player m and player i in σS .
Base step If nm = 0, then player m is the closest predecessor of player i with respect
to σS among all players in S. Then,
{l ∈ S ∩ F(τm, m) | c(l, τm) < c(i, σ0)} = ∅,
and thus (4) is true.
Induction step Assume that (4) holds for every k ∈ S ∩ P(σS, i) with nk < nm . Since
the followers of player m with respect to σS intersected with S∩P(σS, i) are exactly the
players with nk < nm , we actually assume that for every k ∈ S ∩ P(σS, i)∩ F(σS, m)
and r ∈ S ∩ F(τk, k) with c(r, τk) < c(i, σ0) we have
α(S∪{i})τk (k,r ] pk − αk pN τk (k,r ] ≤ 0. (37)
We distinguish between the following cases:
– um ≤ uk for all k ∈ SσS (m, l],
– there exists a player k ∈ SσS (m, l] with um > uk .
Case 1 [um ≤ uk for all k ∈ SσS (m, l]]
We will show that since moving player m behind player l in σS is not beneficial,
moving player m behind player l in τm is also not beneficial.
Note that because of the induction assumption in (37), we know that all players
in (S ∪ {i})τm (m, l] have not been moved by the algorithm and thus N τm (m, l] ⊆
NσS (m, l]. Moreover, since player l is in both σS and τm to the left of the original
component of player i in σ0, we have
(S ∪ {i})τm (m, l] ⊆ SσS (m, l], (38)
and
(S ∪ {i})τm (m, l] = SσS (m, l]. (39)
Note, as processing order σS is optimal for coalition S, we have
αSσS (m,l] pm − αm pNσS (m,l] ≤ 0. (40)
Since um ≤ uk for all k ∈ SσS (m, l], it follows from Proposition 3.2 applied on the
set SσS (m, l] and player m together with (38) that
αSσS (m,l]\(S∪{i})τm (m,l] pm − αm pSσS (m,l]\(S∪{i})τm (m,l] ≥ 0, (41)
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where there is an equality if SσS (m, l] = (S ∪{i})τm (m, l]. As a consequence, we have
α(S∪{i})τm (m,l] pm − αm pN τm (m,l]
= α(S∪{i})τm (m,l] pm − αm
(
p(S∪{i})τm (m,l] + p(S∪{i})τm (m,l]
)
(38),(39)= αSσS (m,l] pm − αm
(
pSσS (m,l] + pSσS (m,l]
)
− (αSσS (m,l]\(S∪{i})τm (m,l] pm − αm pSσS (m,l]\(S∪{i})τm (m,l]
)
= αSσS (m,l] pm − αm pNσS (m,l]
− (αSσS (m,l]\(S∪{i})τm (m,l] pm − αm pSσS (m,l]\(S∪{i})τm (m,l]
)
(40),(41)≤ 0,
and (4) follows.
Case 2 [there exists a player k ∈ SσS (m, l] with um > uk]
Let player q ∈ SσS (m, l] be the closest follower of player m in σS with a smaller
urgency than player m: uq < um ≤ uk for all k ∈ SσS (m, q). Since q ∈ S ∩
P(σS, i) ∩ F(σS, m), it follows from the induction assumption in (37) that
α(S∪{i})τq (q,l] pq − αq pN τq (q,l] ≤ 0.
As a consequence, since uq < um , we also have
α(S∪{i})τq (q,l] pm − αm pN τq (q,l] < 0. (42)
We distinguish between two cases:
– Case 2(i): SσS (m, q) ∩ Sτm (m, l] = ∅, i.e., all players in SσS (m, q) have been
moved by the algorithm,
– Case 2(ii): SσS (m, q)∩ Sτm (m, l] 
= ∅, i.e., not all players in SσS (m, q) have been
moved by the algorithm.
Case 2(i) [SσS (m, q) ∩ Sτm (m, l] = ∅]
We will show that since moving player q behind player l in τq is not beneficial, moving
player m behind player l in τm is also not beneficial.
Since player m is a predecessor of player q in σS , we have
(S ∪ {i})τq (q, l] = (S ∪ {i})σS (q, l] ⊆ (S ∪ {i})σS (m, l] = (S ∪ {i})τm (m, l], (43)
with an equality in case c(q, σS) = c(m, σS). Since all players in SσS (m, q) have been
moved by the algorithm, we have
(S ∪ {i})τm (m, l] = (S ∪ {i})τq (q, l], (44)
if player q has also been moved by the algorithm, and
(S ∪ {i})τm (m, l] = (S ∪ {i})τq (q, l] ∪ {q}, (45)
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if player q has not been moved by the algorithm. As a consequence,
α(S∪{i})τm (m,l] pm − αm pN τm (m,l]
= α(S∪{i})τm (m,l] pm − αm(p(S∪{i})τm (m,l] + p(S∪{i})τm (m,l])
(43),(44)= α(S∪{i})τq (q,l] pm − αm(p(S∪{i})τq (q,l] + p(S∪{i})τq (q,l] + p(S∪{i})τm (m,l]\(S∪{i})τq (q,l])
≤ α(S∪{i})τq (q,l] pm − αm(p(S∪{i})τq (q,l] + p(S∪{i})τq (q,l])
= α(S∪{i})τq (q,l] pm − αm pN τq (q,l] (42)< 0,
if player q has been moved by the algorithm, and
α(S∪{i})τm (m,l] pm − αm pN τm (m,l]
= α(S∪{i})τm (m,l] pm − αm(p(S∪{i})τm (m,l] + p(S∪{i})τm (m,l])
(43),(45)= α(S∪{i})τq (q,l] pm − αm(p(S∪{i})τq (q,l] + p(S∪{i})τq (q,l] + p(S∪{i})τm (m,l]\(S∪{i})τq (q,l])
+ αq pm − αm pq
uq<um
< α(S∪{i})τq (q,l] pm − αm(p(S∪{i})τq (q,l] + p(S∪{i})τq (q,l])
= α(S∪{i})τq (q,l] pm − αm pN τq (q,l] (42)< 0,
if player q has not been moved by the algorithm, which proves (4).
Case 2(ii) [SσS (m, q) ∩ Sτm (m, l] 
= ∅]
We move player m behind player l in τm in two stages. In the first stage, player m
will be moved behind a specific player t . Then, in the second stage, player m will be
moved behind player l. Using similar arguments as in Case 1 we can show that the
move in the first stage is not beneficial, and using similar arguments as in Case 2(i)
we can show that the move in the second stage is not beneficial. As a consequence,
since cost differences have an additive structure and because the moves in both stages
are not beneficial, moving player m behind player l in τm is not beneficial.
Let player t ∈ SσS (m, q) be the closest predecessor of player q in σS who is also
a member of Sτm (m, l]. Note that due to the assumption SσS (m, q) ∩ Sτm (m, l] 
= ∅,
player t exists. Because player t is a predecessor of player q in σS , we have um ≤ uk
for all k ∈ SσS (m, t]. Therefore, using the same arguments as in Case 1, we have
α(S∪{i})τm (m,t] pm − αm pN τm (m,t] ≤ 0. (46)
Since player t is a predecessor of player q in σS and because t ∈ Sτm (m, l] (which
means that player t has not been moved by the algorithm), we have
(S ∪ {i})τq (q, l] = (S ∪ {i})σS (q, l] ⊆ (S ∪ {i})σS (t, l]
= (S ∪ {i})τt (t, l] = (S ∪ {i})τm (t, l], (47)
with an equality in case c(q, σS) = c(t, σS). Because of the definition of player t we
have
(S ∪ {i})τm (t, l] = (S ∪ {i})τq (q, l], (48)
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if player q has been moved by the algorithm, and
(S ∪ {i})τm (t, l] = (S ∪ {i})τq (q, l] ∪ {q}, (49)
if player q has not been moved by the algorithm. As a consequence, by using the
additive structure of cost differences, we have
α(S∪{i})τm (m,l] pm − αm pN τm (m,l]
= (α(S∪{i})τm (m,t] + α(S∪{i})τm (t,l]
)
pm − αm
(
pN τm (m,t] + pN τm (t,l]
)
(46)≤ α(S∪{i})τm (t,l] pm − αm
(
p(S∪{i})τm (t,l] + p(S∪{i})τm (t,l]
)
(47),(48)= α(S∪{i})τq (q,l] pm − αm
(
p(S∪{i})τq (q,l] + p(S∪{i})τq (q,l] + p(S∪{i})τm (t,l]\(S∪{i})τq (q,l]
)
≤ α(S∪{i})τq (q,l] pm − αm
(
p(S∪{i})τq (q,l] + p(S∪{i})τq (q,l]
)
= α(S∪{i})τq (q,l] pm − αm pN τq (q,l] (42)< 0,
if player q has been moved by the algorithm, and
α(S∪{i})τm (m,l] pm − αm pN τm (m,l]
= (α(S∪{i})τm (m,t] + α(S∪{i})τm (t,l]
)
pm − αm
(
pN τm (m,t] + pN τm (t,l]
)
(46)≤ α(S∪{i})τm (t,l] pm − αm
(
p(S∪{i})τm (t,l] + p(S∪{i})τm (t,l]
)
(47),(49)= α(S∪{i})τq (q,l] pm − αm
(
p(S∪{i})τq (q,l] + p(S∪{i})τq (q,l] + p(S∪{i})τm (t,l]\(S∪{i})τq (q,l]
)
+ αq pm − αm pq
uq<um
< α(S∪{i})τq (q,l] pm − αm
(
p(S∪{i})τq (q,l] + p(S∪{i})τq (q,l]
)
= α(S∪{i})τq (q,l] pm − αm pN τq (q,l] (42)< 0,
if player q has not been moved by the algorithm. Hence, by using the additive structure
of cost differences we have shown that moving player m behind player l in τm is not
beneficial.
Appendix C: On Assumption 2 for Theorem 4.1 in Section 4
We will prove that without loss of generality we can assume
(S ∪ { j} ∪ {i})σ0c( j,S∪{ j}∪{i},σ0) = { j},
and
(S ∪ { j} ∪ {i})σ0c(i,S∪{ j}∪{i},σ0) = {i},
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in order to prove the convexity of SoSi sequencing games. Suppose that player i is not
the only player in his component in σ0, i.e.,
{i}  (S ∪ { j} ∪ {i})σ0c(i,σ0).
Then, for example, the direct predecessor of player i in σ0 is a member of S∪{ j}∪{i}.
We can define a different one-machine sequencing situation (N , σ0, p, α) where N =
N ∪ {d} with d /∈ N ,
σ0(k) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
σ0(k) if k ∈ P(σ0, i),
σ0(i) if k = d,
σ0(k) + 1 if k ∈ {i} ∪ F(σ0, i),
pk =
{
pk if k ∈ N ,
0 if k = d,
and
αk =
{
αk if k ∈ N ,
0 if k = d.
Hence, this new sequencing situation (N , σ0, p, α) is obtained from the original
sequencing situation (N , σ0, p, α) by adding a dummy player, with processing time
and costs per time unit both equal to zero, directly in front of player i such that the
predecessor of player i does not belong to S ∪ { j} ∪ {i} anymore.
Let (N , v) be the SoSi sequencing game corresponding to one-machine sequencing
situation (N , σ0, p, α). Although αd = 0 and pd = 0, we can still apply the algorithm
with respect to coalition S ∪ { j} ∪ {i} and initial processing order σ0, because player
d is not a member of S ∪ { j} ∪ {i}. The mutual order of the players in N will be
the same in Alg((N , σ0, p, α), S ∪ { j} ∪ {i}) and Alg((N , σ0, p, α), S ∪ { j} ∪ {i}).
Therefore, v(S ∪ { j} ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ { j} ∪ {i}). Similarly, we have v(S) = v(S),
v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {i}) and v(S ∪ { j}) = v(S ∪ { j}).
Note that if also the direct follower of player i in σ0 is a member of S ∪ { j} ∪ {i},
then we also add a dummy player directly behind player i . By adding a dummy
player directly in front and behind player i , player i will be the only player in his
component. Moreover, all arguments can also be applied to player j . Hence, without
loss of generality we can assume that player i and j are both the only player in their
component in σ0.
Appendix D: Proof of Claims 1–4 in Theorem 4.1
Claim 1 [c(k, σS∪{ j}∪{i}) = c(k, σS∪{i}) ≥ c(i, σS) for all k ∈ Mi (S)]
From (9) it follows that c(k, σS∪{i}) ≥ c(i, σS) for all k ∈ Mi (S). Moreover, from
Proposition 3.5 it follows that if we go from σS∪{i} to σS∪{ j}∪{i}, then the players to
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the right of player j in σS∪{i} will stay in the same component. Since all players in
Mi (S) are to the right of player j in σS∪{i}, we have
c(k, σS∪{ j}∪{i}) = c(k, σS∪{i}),
for all k ∈ Mi (S).
Claim 2 [c(k, σS∪{ j}∪{i}) = c(k, σS∪{ j}) for all k ∈ Mi1c(S)]
From Proposition 3.5 it follows that if we go from σS∪{ j} to σS∪{ j}∪{i}, then the players
to the right of player i in σS∪{ j} will stay in the same component. Since all players in
Mi1c(S) are to the right of player i in σS∪{ j}, we have
c(k, σS∪{ j}∪{i}) = c(k, σS∪{ j}),
for all k ∈ Mi1c(S).
Claim 3 [c(k, σS) = c(k, σS∪{ j}) for all k ∈ Mi2(S)]
From Proposition 3.5 it follows that if we go from σS to σS∪{ j}, then the players to the
right of player j in σS will stay in the same component. Since all players in Mi2(S)
are to the right of player j in σS , we have
c(k, σS) = c(k, σS∪{ j}),
for all k ∈ Mi2(S).
Claim 4 [c(k, σS) = c(k, σS∪{ j}) for all k ∈ Mi1a(S)]
From Proposition 3.6 it follows that the players who are in σS∪{ j} to the left of the
original component of player j have not been moved when going from σS to σS∪{ j}.
Since all players in Mi1a(S) are to the left of the original component of player j in
σS∪{ j}, we have
c(k, σS) = c(k, σS∪{ j}),
for all k ∈ Mi1a(S).
Appendix E: Proof of Claim 5 in Theorem 4.1
Let k ∈ Mi1a(S) ∪ Mi1b(S) ∪ Mi2(S), we will prove
δk ≤ δk .
Note that we consider the players in Mi1a(S) ∪ Mi1b(S) ∪ Mi2(S) from the right to the
left with respect to σ and σS∪{ j}. So, if i ∈ Mi1a(S) ∪ Mi1b(S) ∪ Mi2(S), then player
i is the first player who is moved. From now on we distinguish between two cases:
k = i and k 
= i .
Case 1 [k = i]
As player i is the first player who is moved, we have τ i = σ and τi = σS∪{ j}. Note
that we have
δi = α(S∪{i})τ i (i,r i ] pi − αi pN τ i (i,r i ],
123
On the convexity of step out–step in sequencing games
and
δi = α(S∪{ j}∪{i})τi (i,ri ] pi − αi pN τi (i,ri ].
In order to prove δi ≤ δi , we compare the two sets of players that player i jumps over
in τ i and τi . We will show that all players that player i jumps over in τ i , player i also
jumps over in τi . However, there might be some players that player i jumps over in
τi but not in τ i . It can be shown that these extra players that player i jumps over in
τi all have a higher urgency than player i and thus this results in extra cost savings.
Formally, we show the following three statements:
– Statement 1(a): (S ∪ {i})τ i (i, r i ] = (S ∪ { j} ∪ {i})τi (i, ri ],
– Statement 1(b): (S ∪ {i})τ i (i, r i ] ⊆ (S ∪ { j} ∪ {i})τi (i, ri ],
– Statement 1(c): if (S ∪ {i})τ i (i, r i ]  (S ∪ { j} ∪ {i})τi (i, ri ], then
α(S∪{ j}∪{i})τi (i,ri ]\(S∪{i})τ i (i,r i ] pi − αi p(S∪{ j}∪{i})τi (i,ri ]\(S∪{i})τ i (i,r i ] > 0.
Proof of Statement 1(a) From Claim 1 it follows that c(i, σS∪{i}) = c(i, σS∪{ j}∪{i})
and thus player i will be moved in both processing orders to the same component, i.e.,
c(r i , τ i ) = c(ri , τi ).
Moreover, by the definition of σ and since i /∈ S ∪ { j}, we have c(i, σ ) = c(i, σS∪{ j})
and thus
c(i, τ i ) = c(i, τi ). (50)
Hence, player i is moved in τ i and τi from the same component and to the same
component, so player i jumps in τ i and τi over the same players outside S ∪ { j} ∪ {i}.
Moreover, because σ( j) < σ(i) and thus τ i ( j) < τ i (i), we have j /∈ N τ i (i, r i ]. To
summarize,
(S ∪ {i})τ i (i, r i ] = (S ∪ { j} ∪ {i})τ i (i, r i ] = (S ∪ { j} ∪ {i})τi (i, ri ].
unionsq
Proof of Statement 1(b) Let l ∈ (S ∪ {i})τ i (i, r i ]. From (12) we know that player l is
in τ i in a component at most as far to the right as in τi , i.e.,
c(l, τ i ) ≤ c(l, τi ).
Moreover, from l ∈ (S ∪ {i})τ i (i, r i ] and (50) it follows that
c(i, τi ) = c(i, τ i ) < c(l, τ i ).
Note that there is a strict inequality because player i is the only player in his component.
Combining the previous two equations we get
c(i, τi ) < c(l, τi ), (51)
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i.e., player l is also to the right of player i in τi . Now suppose player l is to the right
of player ri in τi , then player l is to the right of player i in σS∪{ j}∪{i} and thus
c(l, σS∪{i}) ≤ c(i, σS∪{i}) = c(i, σS∪{ j}∪{i}) ≤ c(l, σS∪{ j}∪{i}),
where the first inequality follows from l ∈ (S ∪ {i})τ i (i, r i ] and the first equality
follows from Claim 1. Therefore, it follows that the swap of player i and player l with
respect to σS∪{ j}∪{i} is admissible. From Proposition 3.1 it then follows that ui ≥ ul .
However, since player i jumps over player l when going from σ to σS∪{i}, it follows
from Proposition 3.1 that ul > ui , which contradicts ui ≥ ul . Therefore l cannot be
to the right of player ri in τi , so player l is to the left of player ri in τi . Combining this
result with (51) we have
l ∈ (S ∪ { j} ∪ {i})τi (i, ri ].
unionsq
Proof of Statement 1(c) Let (S∪{i})τ i (i, r i ]  (S∪{ j}∪{i})τi (i, ri ]. For every player
l ∈ (S ∪{ j}∪{i})τi (i, ri ]\(S ∪{i})τ i (i, r i ], we have ul > ui since player i jumps over
player l when going from σS∪{ j} to σS∪{ j}∪{i} (cf. Proposition 3.1). Combining this
with Proposition 3.2 applied on the set U = (S ∪ { j} ∪ {i})τi (i, ri ]\(S ∪ {i})τ i (i, r i ]
and player i , we have that
αi
pi
<
α(S∪{ j}∪{i})τi (i,ri ]\(S∪{i})τ i (i,r i ]
p(S∪{ j}∪{i})τi (i,ri ]\(S∪{i})τ i (i,r i ]
,
i.e., α(S∪{ j}∪{i})τi (i,ri ]\(S∪{i})τ i (i,r i ] pi − αi p(S∪{ j}∪{i})τi (i,ri ]\(S∪{i})τ i (i,r i ] > 0. unionsq
Note that if in Statement 1(b) we have equality, then the inequality δi ≤ δi follows
immediately from Statement 1(a). Next, if in Statement 1(b) we have a strict subset,
then
δi = α(S∪{i})τ i (i,r i ] pi − αi pN τ i (i,r i ]
= α(S∪{i})τ i (i,r i ] pi − αi
(
p(S∪{i})τ i (i,r i ] + p(S∪{i})τ i (i,r i ]
)
1(c)
< α(S∪{i})τ i (i,r i ] pi − αi
(
p(S∪{i})τ i (i,r i ] + p(S∪{i})τ i (i,r i ]
)
+ α(S∪{ j}∪{i})τi (i,ri ]\(S∪{i})τ i (i,r i ] pi − αi p(S∪{ j}∪{i})τi (i,ri ]\(S∪{i})τ i (i,r i ]
1(a)=
(
α(S∪{i})τ i (i,r i ] + α(S∪{ j}∪{i})τi (i,ri ]\(S∪{i})τ i (i,r i ]
)
pi
− αi
(
p(S∪{i})τ i (i,r i ] + p(S∪{ j}∪{i})τi (i,ri ]\(S∪{i})τ i (i,r i ] + p(S∪{ j}∪{i})τi (i,ri ]
)
= α(S∪{ j}∪{i})τi (i,ri ] pi − αi
(
p(S∪{ j}∪{i})τi (i,ri ] + p(S∪{ j}∪{i})τi (i,ri ]
)
= α(S∪{ j}∪{i})τi (i,ri ] pi − αi pN τi (i,ri ]
= δi .
The idea behind the previous strict inequality is as follows. Player i jumps in τ i over the
same players as in τi , but additionally player i jumps in τi also over some extra players.
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It follows from Statement 1(c) that these extra players all have a higher urgency and
thus the jump of player i over those extra players results in cost savings.
Case 2 [k 
= i]
The difference with respect to Case 1 is that in this case player k is not necessarily
the only player in its component, while in Case 1 player i was the only player in its
component of S ∪ { j} ∪ {i} with respect to σ0. Another difference is that now player
k might not be the first player who is moved, and thus τ k and σ , and τi and σS∪{ j}
might differ.
Note that
δk = α(S∪{i})τk (k,rk ] pk − αk pN τk (k,rk ],
and
δk = α(S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ] pk − αk pN τk (k,mk ].
In order to prove δk ≤ δk , we compare the two sets of players that player k jumps over
in τ k and τk . We will show that all players, excluding player j , that player k jumps
over in τ k , player k also jumps over in τk . Formally, we show the following three
statements (which are similar to Statements 1(a)–(c)):
– Statement 2(a): ((S ∪ {i})τ k (k, rk]
) \{ j} = (S ∪ { j} ∪ {i})τk (k, rk],
– Statement 2(b): (S ∪ {i})τ k (k, rk] ⊆ ((S ∪ { j} ∪ {i})τk (k, rk]) \{ j},
– Statement 2(c): if (S ∪ {i})τ k (k, rk]  ((S ∪ { j} ∪ {i})τk (k, rk]) \{ j}, then
α(((S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ])\{ j})\
(
(S∪{i})τk (k,rk ]
) pk
−αk p(((S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ])\{ j})\((S∪{i})τk (k,rk ]) > 0.
Note that in the proof of Statement 1(a) and 1(c) the fact that player i is the only player
in its component is not used and therefore the proofs for Statements 2(a) and 2(b) are
similar.
Proof of Statement 2(b) Let l ∈ (S ∪ {i})τ k (k, rk]. From (13) we know that player l
is in τ k in a component at most as far to the right as in τk , i.e.,
c(l, τ k) ≤ c(l, τk).
Moreover, from (11) we have c(k, σ ) = c(k, σS∪{ j}) and thus c(k, τ k) = c(k, τk).
Together with l ∈ (S ∪ {i})τ k (k, rk], it follows that
c(k, τk) = c(k, τ k) ≤ c(l, τ k).
Combining the previous two equations we get
c(k, τk) ≤ c(l, τk). (52)
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This implies
τk(k) < τk(l).
For this, note that if we have an equality in (52), then c(k, τ k) = c(l, τ k). Moreover,
since l ∈ (S ∪ {i})τ k (k, rk], we know τ k(k) < τ k(l) and thus also τk(k) < τk(l)
(because both τk and τ k are urgency respecting processing orders and moreover
because the tiebreaking rule, in case of equal urgencies, mentioned in condition (iii)
of σ is the same tiebreaking rule as in property (iv) of the algorithm). On the other
hand, if there is a strict inequality in (52), then automatically τk(k) < τk(l). Using
similar arguments as in the proof of Statement 1(b) we have
l ∈ N τk (k, rk],
and since l ∈ S ∪ {i}, we have
l ∈ ((S ∪ { j} ∪ {i})τk (k, rk]
) \{ j}. unionsq
Now we continue with the main line of the proof. Using similar arguments as in
Case 1, it follows from Statement 2(a)–(c) that
α(S∪{i})τk (k,rk ] pk − αk
(
p(S∪{i})τk (k,rk ] + p((S∪{i})τk (k,rk ])\{ j}
)
≤ α((S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ])\{ j} pk − αk
(
p((S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ])\{ j} + p(S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ]
)
.
(53)
We distinguish from now on between the following four cases: Case 2(i) where
player k does not jump over player j in both τ k and τk ; Case 2(ii) where player k
jumps over player j in both τ k and τk ; Case 2(iii) where player k jumps over player
j in τ k but not in τk and Case 2(iv) where player k jumps over player j in τk but not
in τ k .
Case 2(i) [ j /∈ N τ k (k, rk] and j /∈ N τk (k, rk]]
Note that if in Statement 2(b) we have equality, then the inequality δk ≤ δk follows
immediately from Statement 2(a). Next, if in Statement 2(b) we have a strict subset,
then
δk = α(S∪{i})τk (k,rk ] pk − αk pN τk (k,rk ]
j /∈N τk (k,rk ]= α(S∪{i})τk (k,rk ] pk − αk
(
p(S∪{i})τk (k,rk ] + p((S∪{i})τk (k,rk ])\{ j}
)
(53)
< α((S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ])\{ j} pk − αk
(
p((S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ])\{ j} + p(S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ]
)
j /∈N τk (k,rk ]= α(S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ] pk − αk
(
p(S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ] + p(S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ]
)
= α(S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ] pk − αk pN τk (k,rk ]
= δk .
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The idea behind the strict inequality is as follows. Player k jumps in τ k over the same
players as in τk , but additionally player k jumps in τk also over some extra players.
It follows from Statement 2(c) that these extra players all have a higher urgency and
thus the jump of player k over those extra players results in cost savings.
Case 2(ii) [ j ∈ N τ k (k, rk] and j ∈ N τk (k, rk]]
It follows that
δk = α(S∪{i})τk (k,rk ] pk − αk pN τk (k,rk ]
j∈N τk (k,rk ]= α(S∪{i})τk (k,rk ] pk − αk
(
p(S∪{i})τk (k,rk ] + p((S∪{i})τk (k,rk ])\{ j} + p j
)
(53)≤ α((S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ])\{ j} pk − αk
(
p((S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ])\{ j} + p(S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ] + p j
)
j∈N τk (k,rk ]= α((S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ])\{ j} pk − αk
(
p(S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ] + p(S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ]
)
α j pk>0
<
(
α((S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ])\{ j} + α j
)
pk − αk
(
p(S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ] + p(S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ]
)
j∈N τk (k,rk ]= α(S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ] pk − αk
(
p(S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ] + p(S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ]
)
= α(S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ] pk − αk pN τk (k,rk ]
= δk .
The idea behind the strict inequality is as follows. All players, including player j ,
that player k jumps over in τ k , player k also jumps over in τk . However, as player j
belongs to coalition S ∪{ j}∪ {i} and not to coalition S ∪{i}, there are some extra cost
savings in δk . These extra cost savings are due to the reduction of the processing time
for player j due to the jump of player k, namely α j pk .
Case 2(iii) [ j ∈ N τ k (k, rk] and j /∈ N τk (k, rk]]
It follows that
δk = α(S∪{i})τk (k,rk ] pk − αk pN τk (k,rk ]
j∈N τk (k,rk ]= α(S∪{i})τk (k,rk ] pk − αk
(
p(S∪{i})τk (k,rk ] + p((S∪{i})τk (k,rk ])\{ j} + p j
)
(53)≤ α((S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ])\{ j} pk − αk
(
p((S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ])\{ j} + p(S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ] + p j
)
j /∈N τk (k,rk ]= α(S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ] pk − αk
(
p(S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ] + p(S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ] + p j
)
αk p j >0
< α(S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ] pk − αk
(
p(S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ] + p(S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ]
)
= α(S∪{ j}∪{i})τk (k,rk ] pk − αk pN τk (k,rk ]
= δk .
The idea behind the strict inequality is as follows. All players, excluding player j , that
player k jumps over in τ k , player k also jumps over in τk . However, as player k jumps
over player j in τ k and not in τk , the completion time of player k will increase with at
least p j more in τk than in τ k and thus the cost savings in δk are less than in δk .
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Case 2(iv) [ j /∈ N τ k (k, rk] and j ∈ N τk (k, rk]]
We will show that this case is not possible. As player k jumps over player j when going
from σS∪{ j} to σS∪{ j}∪{i}, player j did not jump over player k when going from σS
to σS∪{ j} (otherwise there would be a contradiction with respect to the urgencies, cf.
Proposition 3.1). Hence, the mutual order of player k and player j is in σS the same as in
σS∪{ j} and thus σS(k) < σS( j). Using Fig. 10 this implies that k ∈ Mi1(S). Moreover,
as j /∈ N τ k (k, rk] it follows from Fig. 12 that k /∈ Mi1a(S) and thus k ∈ Mi1b(S).
Therefore, it follows from Fig. 10c that c(k, σS∪{ j}) ≥ c( j, σS). Hence,
c( j, σS) ≤ c(k, σS∪{ j}) ≤ c( j, σS∪{ j}),
where the last inequality follows from j ∈ N τk (k, rk]. Therefore, it follows that the
swap of player k and player j with respect to σS∪{ j} is admissible.
From Proposition 3.1 it then follows that uk ≥ u j . However, since player k jumps
over player j when going from σS∪{ j} to σS∪{ j}∪{i}, it follows from Proposition 3.1
that u j > uk too, a contradiction.
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